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Abstract
Cross-country studies associate ﬁnancial liberalization with increases in aggregate productivity.
This paper argues that this ﬁnding can be mainly attributed to reductions in distortions in capital
markets that promote competition and encourage ﬁrms’ investments in technology. I ﬁrst develop a
simple small open economy model in which capital controls distort access to international borrowing.
I show that this distortion can aﬀect market competition and ﬁrms’ innovation incentives. Financial
liberalization removes this distortion and fosters investments in technology through two forces.
First, better credit conditions encourage ﬁrms that gain access to international funds to raise their
innovation eﬀorts. Second, their market rivals respond to the threat of competition by innovating
more. In my empirical analysis, I test the implications of the model using ﬁrm-level census data
around the deregulation of international ﬁnancial ﬂows in Hungary. I exploit diﬀerences in the
access to international borrowing prior to the reform as a source of cross-sectional variation. The
results conﬁrm that ﬁrms that gain access to international funds increased their productivity and
their probability of undertaking innovation activities. I provide direct evidence that this is due
to greater use of external funds. Responding to the tighter competition, their market rivals also
increased their investments in technology. Tougher competition is also observed in reductions in
markups, industry concentration, and productivity and markup dispersions within sectors. At
the macro level, a decomposition exercise shows that, reversing the previous pattern of growth,
the increase in within-ﬁrm productivity explains the bulk of the expansion aggregate productivity
growth following the liberalization.
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11 Introduction
There is a broad consensus among economists that diﬀerences in income per capita across countries
can be mainly attributed to diﬀerences in total factor productivity (TFP).1 Recent research has
shown that these diﬀerences can be in part due to policy distortions aﬀecting the allocation of
resources and ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in technology. Restrictions in the access to capital markets
are an important source of these distortions, as for example they can prevent ﬁrms from investing
in more advanced technologies. In the last decades, many countries have lifted capital controls
in order to beneﬁt from the expansion of ﬁnancial globalization. Remarkably, these reforms have
been followed by increases in aggregate TFP (Levine 2001; Bonﬁglioli 2008; Bekaert, Harvey, and
Lundblad 2011). A natural question to ask is then: What are the underlying causes of the expansion
in aggregate TFP following ﬁnancial liberalization episodes?
In this paper I investigate a novel channel linking capital markets, competition and ﬁrms’ in-
vestments in technology that can explain this phenomenon. I propose a simple small open economy
model in which capital controls create distortions in the access to international capital markets.
The model shows that, in an environment where competition and productivity are endogenous,
these distortions not only aﬀect the investments in technology of ﬁrms restricted from borrow-
ing from abroad, but also the investments of their market rivals. By removing these distortions,
ﬁnancial liberalization promotes these investments through two sources. First, better credit condi-
tions encourage ﬁrms that gain access to international funds to invest more in technology. Second,
pro-competitive forces induce their market rivals to do the same. The increase in both ﬁrms’ invest-
ments in technology yields an acceleration of aggregate productivity growth. I test the implications
of the model using the liberalization of international ﬁnancial ﬂows in Hungary in 2001. I focus
my analysis on Hungary for two reasons. First, regulations in force prior to the liberalization cre-
ated asymmetries in the access to international borrowing across ﬁrms that I exploit as a source
of cross-sectional variation in my empirical analysis. Second, unlike most capital account opening
episodes, the liberalization in Hungary was isolated from major reforms (such as trade openness,
FDI liberalization, bank deregulation or changes in the competition policy). This case oﬀers a
unique event to study the forces at play during ﬁnancial liberalization episodes.
I ﬁrst develop a small open economy model in which capital controls create asymmetries in the
access to capital markets that distort competition and ﬁrms’ innovation incentives. The economy
is populated by two types of ﬁrms - home and foreign - that compete in an oligopolistic market for
a homogeneous good. This capital-scarce economy uses foreign funds to ﬁnance its investments.
However, there are capital controls in force for domestic ﬁrms that increase their borrowing costs.
In this way, capital controls create a wedge between the cost of capital of domestic and foreign
ﬁrms. The model shows that this distortion aﬀects competition and the innovation incentives of
both types of ﬁrms. Greater cost of capital reduces domestic ﬁrms’ post-innovation proﬁts and,
thus, their innovation incentives. Better access to capital markets allows foreign ﬁrms to earn
ﬁnancial rents, which reduce their innovation incentives. As a result, all ﬁrms engage less in these
1See Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), and Caselli (2005).
2activities and aggregate productivity grows at a slower pace.
The model oﬀers several implications of a reduction in the distortion caused by ﬁnancial lib-
eralization. First, both domestic and foreign ﬁrms increase their innovation eﬀorts. For domestic
ﬁrms, better access to capital markets raises their post-innovation rents and thus their incentives
to undertake these activities. For foreign ﬁrms, tighter competition raises their incremental proﬁts
from innovating, which encourages their innovation eﬀorts. Notably, since the distortion has a
larger impact on domestic ﬁrms’ innovation activities, their innovation eﬀorts increase relatively
more. Second, foreign ﬁrms’ markups decrease. This reduction stems from two sources: the fall
in the extra rents coming from the asymmetric access to capital markets, and the decline in the
productivity gap relative to their domestic competitors. Third, the decline in the productivity
gap between foreign and domestic ﬁrms is inversely related to the initial productivity diﬀerence.
Fourth, greater innovation eﬀorts lead to an acceleration of aggregate productivity growth.
I then test the implications of the model using the deregulation of international ﬁnancial ﬂows
in Hungary in 2001. This reform provides a good source of arguably exogenous time variation, as
it was one of the requirements that eastern European countries had to fulﬁll in order to join the
European Union in 2004. As a source of cross-sectional variation, I use diﬀerences in the access to
international borrowing prior to the reform. In particular, the regulations in force prior to 2001
created asymmetries in the access to international funds between domestic and foreign ﬁrms. Whilst
these regulations led domestic ﬁrms to only borrow locally in the national currency, foreign ﬁrms
directly accessed international funds. As reported by previous studies (Desai, Foley, and Hines
2003; and Desai, Foley, and Forbes 2008, among others), this preferential access to international
funds oﬀers foreign ﬁrms ﬁnancial advantages over their local competitors. I exploit this asymmetric
access to international borrowing to study the diﬀerential impact of the reform on home and foreign
companies. I use ﬁrm-level data, covering the population of manufacturing ﬁrms in the period 1992-
2008, from ﬁrms’ balance sheets reported to tax authorities and provided by the National Bank
of Hungary (NBH). I complement my analysis with the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Surveys (BEEPS) of the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, which report data on credit market conditions, R&D and innovation activities for a
cross-section of ﬁrms.
In my empirical analysis, I ﬁrst study the diﬀerential impact of the liberalization on domestic
ﬁrms’ investment in capital, productivity, and R&D and innovation activities. Reduced-form regres-
sions show that domestic ﬁrms see a greater increase in capital intensity (25%), labor productivity
(5%) and RTFP (3%) relative to their foreign competitors. They also increased their probability
of conducting R&D as well as innovation activities (9% and 12%, respectively). The results reveal
the pro-competitive forces of ﬁnancial liberalization: in sectors where competition deepened the
most, foreign ﬁrms increased their productivity more. Second, I assess the mechanism proposed in
this paper by investigating whether this expansion correlates with higher use of external ﬁnance.
Empirical results conﬁrm that credit conditions signiﬁcantly improved for domestic ﬁrms, which ac-
cordingly increased their indebtedness ratio (23%). These results are consistent with implication 1,
which states that ﬁnancial openness promotes all ﬁrms’ investments in technology, but those of do-
3mestic ﬁrms relatively more. Third, as predicted by implication 2, tougher competition led foreign
ﬁrms’ markups to fall. This eﬀect was signiﬁcantly more important in sectors where competition
was initially more distorted. Fourth, I ﬁnd a larger decline of revenue TFP (RTFP, hereafter) and
markup gaps between domestic and foreign ﬁrms in sectors with higher initial dispersion, in line
with implication 3.2 This ﬁnding is consistent with a similar reduction in the concentration index
(Lernex index). Finally, a structural-break test conﬁrms the acceleration of aggregate productiv-
ity following the ﬁnancial liberalization stated in implication 4. Overall, aggregate productivity
growth rose by 3% per year over the three years following the liberalization. A decomposition exer-
cise indicates that, reversing the previous pattern, this expansion is mainly explained by increases
in within-ﬁrm productivity (82%). This result is consistent with the mechanism proposed in this
paper, emphasizing changes in ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in technology as a result of the reduction
in distortions in capital markets.
Brieﬂy, these results suggest that the decline in distortions in the access to international cap-
ital markets fostered domestic ﬁrms’ investments in technology to a remarkable extent. In turn,
pro-competitive forces led their foreign rivals to invest more in technology as well. The greater
expansion of domestic ﬁrms is associated with decreases in the concentration index and the RTFP
and markups dispersion within sectors. At the macro level, aggregate productivity growth accel-
erated signiﬁcantly in the years following the reform. I show that these results are not subject to
sample selection concerns and are not driven by pre-existing trends. Furthermore, they are robust
to controlling for a full set of ﬁrm and sector characteristics.
This paper adds to a long literature on the relationship between international ﬁnancial integra-
tion and economic growth. Recent cross-country studies ﬁnd a robust impact of capital account
openness on growth, mainly driven by the expansion of aggregate productivity (among them, Levine
2001; Bonﬁglioli 2008; and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad 2011).3 Bonﬁglioli (2008) ﬁnds a posi-
tive eﬀect of ﬁnancial integration in aggregate productivity over the ﬁve years following the reform.
Examining longer horizons, Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2011) report that the eﬀects are not
temporary, but permanent. In addition, they ﬁnd that the expansion of aggregate productivity
accounts for the bulk of the increase in income per capita after ﬁnancial liberalization episodes.
However, these cross-country panel regressions do not address in detail the driving forces behind this
expansion. Levchenko, Ranciere, and Thoenig (2009) build on this point and, using cross-industry
and cross-country data, present evidence of pro-competitive forces. This paper complements these
studies, by using, for the ﬁrst time, ﬁrm-level census data around a particular ﬁnancial liberalization
episode to investigate the forces driving the expansion of aggregate productivity.
There is a long line of research addressing the question of whether competition encourages inno-
vation activities. While previous studies ﬁnd a positive direct eﬀect of competition on innovation,
2It is essential to diﬀerentiate revenue TFP from physical TFP. Unfortunately, I am only able to measure RTFP
given the lack of information on ﬁrms’ prices. See also Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008).
3Several studies also emphasize a positive relationship between ﬁnancial deepening and productivity enhancements.
In particular, they ﬁnd that countries with more developed ﬁnancial systems enjoy higher rates of productivity growth.
See for example, King and Levine (1993b); King and Levine (1993a); Benhabib and Spiegel (2000); and Beck, Levine,
and Loayza (2000).
4recent evidence ﬁnds that this monotonic relationship is unclear.4 This paper analyzes the question
from a diﬀerent angle: it identiﬁes a particular distortion undermining competition and asks how
its removal aﬀects innovation. The model I introduce is close to the textbook one-period model
of Aghion and Howitt (2009), to which I add asymmetries in the access to capital markets. The
model shows that these asymmetries aﬀect ﬁrms’ optimal strategies. The removal of this distortion
then tightens competition and encourages both constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms to increase
their innovation intensities. The eﬀect on unconstrained ﬁrms is closely related to industry studies
reporting that deeper competition lead incumbents to raise their investments aimed at increasing
their productivity (see Holmes and Schmitz 2010). Another branch of the literature on innovation
investigates whether ﬁnancial constraints limit these activities.5 This paper is also closely related
to these studies, and particularly to Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010) who ﬁnd that in non-
OECD countries, ﬁnancial frictions restrain domestic ﬁrms from undertaking innovation activities.
Supporting this view, I ﬁnd that the easing of credit conditions indeed fosters domestic ﬁrms’
innovation activities.
This paper is also related to the literature emphasizing that ﬁrm-level distortions can lower
aggregate TFP (Restuccia and Rogerson 2008; Hsieh and Klenow 2009; Peters 2012). This paper
is closest to Peters (2012) who shows that, in an environment where productivity is endogenous,
these distortions aﬀect not only its level, but also its growth rate. My paper departs from Peters’
(2012) in that I identify a policy distortion and study how this distortion aﬀects competition and
ﬁrms’ innovation incentives. Then, I use ﬁrm-level census data around a case event to test the
model’s implications. Focusing on ﬁnancial imperfections, Midrigan and Xu (2012) and Jeong and
Townsend (2007) show that ﬁnancial frictions can preclude credit-constrained ﬁrms from adopting
more eﬃcient technologies and, in turn, reduce aggregate productivity. While this paper supports
this view, it emphasizes the pro-competitive forces underlying movements in aggregate TFP. In a
framework where competition is endogenous, asymmetric access to capital markets not only aﬀects
credit-constrained ﬁrms, but also unconstrained ﬁrms. In this way, the strategic interaction among
ﬁrms ampliﬁes the eﬀect of the distortion in capital markets. In my empirical analysis, I show that
this eﬀect can be substantial and can account for an important part of the increase in aggregate
TFP following ﬁnancial deregulation episodes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I present the model and
derive qualitative predictions of a reduction in distortions in the access to capital markets following
ﬁnancial liberalization. Section 3 describes the liberalization of international ﬁnancial ﬂows in Hun-
4For example, Nickell (1996) and Blundell, Griﬃth, and van Reenen (1999) ﬁnd a positive and monotonic relation-
ship between competition and innovation. Challenging these results, Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth, and Howitt
(2005) present evidence of an inverted-U shape. Recently, using a panel of French companies, Askenazy, Cahn, and
Irac (2013) illustrate that the inverted-U shape ﬂatters when taking ﬁrm size into account.
5To name a few, Savignac (2008) ﬁnds that ﬁnancial constraints reduce the probability of undertaking innovation
activities in a panel of French ﬁrms. Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011), using a direct measure of the access to
external capital on German ﬁrms, report that credit conditions restraint expenditures on R&D, especially for small
ﬁrms. Mulkay, Hall, and Mairesse (2000) and Bond, Harhoﬀ, and Reenen (2010) focus on the relationship between
cash ﬂows and innovation activities.
5gary and how the regulations in force aﬀected ﬁrms’ access to international borrowing. Section 4
presents the data. In Section 5, I discuss the identiﬁcation strategy and test the model’s prediction
at the ﬁrm, industry and aggregate levels. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
In this section, I develop a simple small open economy model to study the impact of distortions in
the access to international capital markets on competition and ﬁrms’ innovation incentives. The
model considers three main ingredients. First, I allow for asymmetries in the access to capital
markets among ﬁrms. In particular, I assume that the economy is populated by two types of ﬁrms:
home and foreign. I let foreign ﬁrms have perfect access to international capital markets, but home
ﬁrms are subject to capital controls. These controls take the form of a per unit tax that domestic
ﬁrms have to pay to raise capital abroad. This tax creates a wedge between the interest rates paid
by foreign and domestic ﬁrms. The model shows that this wedge aﬀects proﬁts and innovation
incentives. Second, to account for pro-competitive forces, I consider an endogenous market struc-
ture in which foreign and domestic ﬁrms compete with one another. As such, ﬁrms compete in an
oligopolistic fashion in a narrowly deﬁned market. Under this framework, capital controls faced by
domestic ﬁrms also aﬀect the optimal response of their foreign competitors. Finally, to endogenously
generate aggregate TFP growth, I let ﬁrms innovate and choose their optimal innovation intensities.
2.1 Setup
Consider a one-period small open economy. The economy is capital-scarce, but capital can be
imported from the rest of the world. Labor is internationally immobile.
Final Sector
The economy is composed of a single ﬁnal good Y , produced by a representative ﬁrm in a perfectly
competitive market, and its price is taken as a numeraire. This ﬁrm combines the output yj of a con-
tinuum of measure one of j intermediate industries operating with a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion with a unitary elasticity of substitution for each industry. Formally, Y = exp
 
R 1
0 ln(y(j))dj
!
.
Given this ﬁnal good production, the optimal demand for each sector is y(j) = Y
p(j).
Intermediate Sector
I let each intermediate industry be composed of two ﬁrms: home and foreign (H and F), which
diﬀer in their access to capital markets. In addition to their production activities, ﬁrms can in-
novate to increase their initial eﬃciency level. The timing is as follows: at the beginning of the
period, they choose their innovation eﬀorts and, after learning the result of the innovation process,
6they decide whether to produce. At the end of the period, ﬁrms earn proﬁts and pay the factors
of production. Firms take the innovation eﬀorts of other agents and factor prices as given. For
expositional purposes, I consider a partial equilibrium setting.
-Market Structure and Competition. In each intermediate industry, domestic and foreign ﬁrms
compete à la Bertrand for a homogeneous good. In equilibrium, only the ﬁrm with the lowest
marginal cost will be active. Given the unitary elasticity of the aggregate demand function, the
most eﬃcient ﬁrm has to resort to limiting pricing to deter entry, and sets its price equal to the
marginal cost of its competitor.
-Capital Markets. I consider a small economy open to international ﬁnancial markets. I let
this economy be small enough such that the international interest rate r∗ is exogenous. The
economy is capital-scarce, so it uses foreign funds to ﬁnance its investments. However, this access
to international funds is asymmetric between domestic and foreign ﬁrms. Foreign ﬁrms can access
them directly, but domestic ﬁrms are subject to capital controls.6 I model capital controls as Farhi
and Werning (2012). In particular, I assume that domestic ﬁrms have to pay a tax for each unit
of funds they raise abroad: ˜ τ. This tax is then rebated as a lump sum to the domestic household.
The interest rate paid by domestic ﬁrms is as follows:
(1 + r) = (1 + ˜ τ)(1 + r∗)
where r and r∗ are the interest rates paid by domestic and foreign ﬁrms, respectively. In this
framework, capital openness can be seen as a decrease in the tax rate, ˜ τ. Note that if capital
markets were fully integrated, the domestic interest rate would equal the international rate, as
in the standard small open economy model. It is also important to note that, similarly to the
standard setting, capital ﬂows from abroad until the return of the investment equals the interest
rate paid on those funds. This model only diﬀers from the standard in that here, capital mar-
kets are segmented. That is, foreign agents bring capital from abroad until the return of their
local investment equals the international interest rate. Domestic agents borrow capital until the
return of their investment equals their borrowing costs (the international interest rate plus the tax).
-Production. To produce, intermediate ﬁrms operate with a Cobb-Douglas function,
f(q,k,l) = q(j) kα
(j)l1−α
(j)
where q, k, and l represent each ﬁrm’s physical productivity, capital and labor, respectively, and
α ∈ (0,1). Firms rent capital and hire labor to operate. For expositional simplicity, I assume
that, at the beginning of the period, foreign ﬁrms are at least as productive as home ﬁrms, i.e.
6This assumption matches the asymmetries in the access to international borrowing prevailing in Hungary before
the liberalization. I discuss this in detail in Section 3.
7q(F,j) ≥ q(H,j).7
-Technology and Innovation. I follow Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt
(1992), and assume that ﬁrms’ productivity evolves in a quality ladder. More precisely, productivity
q is equal to λns, where λ > 1, and ns denotes the technology level of a home or foreign ﬁrm,
s = {H,F}. Research technology implies that innovation is stochastic and its probability depends
on ﬁrms’ innovation eﬀorts. Innovations stem from two sources: either F ﬁrms improve the existing
technology, or H ﬁrms innovate aiming to overtake their foreign rivals’ technology.8 If an F ﬁrm
succeeds in improving its technology, it reaches the next step in the quality ladder and its technology
increases by λ. If an H ﬁrm produces an innovation, it obtains a new state-of-the-art technology,
λq(j).9 Under this speciﬁcation, the productivity diﬀerence between F and H ﬁrms in industry j
can be expressed as a function of ∆(j) ≡ n(F,j) − n(H,j), where ∆(j) denotes the technological gap
between F and H ﬁrms.
R&D technology is such that if a ﬁrm wants to have an innovation intensity of x(s,j), it has to
hire Γ units of labor. In particular,
Γ(x(F,j),∆(j)) = λ−∆(j) 1
φ
x2
(F,j)
2
and Γ(x(H,j)) =
1
φ
x2
(H,j)
2
where φ denotes the eﬃciency of the innovation technology, and x(F,j) and x(H,j) ∈ (0,1) denote
ﬁrms’ innovation intensities. Note that the eﬃciency of innovation is equal for both F and H ﬁrms
(φ), but foreign ﬁrms might enjoy lower innovation costs. Similarly to Klette and Kortum (2004),
Atkeson and Burstein (2010) and Peters (2012), I let larger ﬁrms have lower innovation costs. In
particular, I follow Peters (2012) and assume that the innovations of F ﬁrms are easier when their
technological advantage is greater, i.e. λ−∆.10 These functional forms are also appealing because
they ensure that ﬁrms’ innovation eﬀorts diﬀer solely in their asymmetric access to capital markets,
i.e. if ﬁrms enjoyed equal borrowing costs, their innovation intensities would be equal. In this way,
they allow for the isolation of the mechanism proposed in this paper, namely how distortions in
the access to international capital markets aﬀect ﬁrms’ innovation eﬀorts.11
7This assumption is not crucial, but it simpliﬁes substantially the exposition. Furthermore, as presented in Section
5, this assumption is consistent with the empirical patterns observed in Hungary prior to the reform. The greater
productivity level of foreign ﬁrms is not a distinctive trait of the Hungarian economy. As reported by Gorodnichenko
and Schnitzer (2010), in developing economies, foreign ﬁrms are more productive than domestics, both in terms of
labor productivity and TFP.
8In a one-period Bertrand competition model, a laggard ﬁrm would not invest to simply catchup with its rival’s
technology, as it would earn zero proﬁts. See Grossman and Helpman (1991).
9To be consistent with the literature, I assume that the probability of two ﬁrms innovating at the same time is
negligible. Since these are two independent events, their joint probability is of second order and thus close to zero.
10This assumption accounts for the empirical ﬁnding that innovation intensity is constant for large ﬁrms (Crepon,
Duguet, and Mairesse 1998; Klette and Kortum 2004), and guarantees that a ﬁrm’s growth is independent of its size,
i.e. Gibrat’s Law.
11Importantly, if innovation costs were not scaled by foreign ﬁrms’ productivity advantage, all the implications of
the model would still hold.
82.2 Firm Behavior
In this section, I study how distortions in the access to international capital markets aﬀect ﬁrms’
proﬁts and thus their innovation activities. I solve ﬁrms’ optimal strategies by backward induction.
Recall that, at the beginning of the period, ﬁrms choose their innovation intensities and, after
learning about the results of their innovation, they decide whether to produce. Accordingly, I ﬁrst
compute ﬁrms’ proﬁts from producing activities at the end of the period, and then their innovation
intensities.
In particular, after setting its price and minimizing its production costs, the active ﬁrm’s proﬁt
from production activities is given by Π(j) = (1 − ξ−1
(j))Y , where ξ(j) denotes its markup. This
expression shows that a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is proportional to its markup. I study then how the markup
is determined if the ﬁrm succeeds in improving the existing technology, or if it keeps its initial
productivity level.
If the foreign ﬁrm is active in equilibrium, its markup will be either
ξ
post
(F,j) ≡
p(j)
MC(F,j)
= τ λ∆(j)+1 or ξ
pre
(F,j) ≡
p(j)
MC(F,j)
= τ λ∆(j) (1)
where post and pre denote the markup if it succeeds in improving its technology or maintains its
initial productivity level. τ is proportional to the tax rate, τ ≡ (1 + ˜ τ)α > 1, and represents
the diﬀerence in borrowing costs for domestic and foreign ﬁrms.12 Equations (1) illustrate that,
regardless of any technological advantage that foreign ﬁrms might have, they enjoy a ﬁnancial
advantage stemming from their preferential access to capital markets. In other words, capital
controls raise the borrowing costs that domestic ﬁrms face and, thus, their marginal costs. This
diﬀerence in marginal costs allows foreign ﬁrms to set higher prices. By this means, asymmetric
access to international capital markets oﬀers foreign ﬁrms a source of ﬁnancial rents.
Then, at the beginning of the period, foreign ﬁrms’ maximization program is
Maxx(F,j) x(F,j) Π
post
(F,j) + (1 − x(F,j) − x(H,j))Π
pre
(F,j) − wΓ(x(F,j),∆(j)) (2)
where Π
post
(F,j) and Π
pre
(F,j) denote the post- and pre-innovation proﬁts from production activities, and
w represents the wage.
If the home ﬁrm in sector j succeeds in climbing ahead on the quality ladder and becomes the
industry leader, its markups will be given by
ξ
post
(H,j) ≡
p(j)
MC(H,j)
=
1
τ
λ (3)
Otherwise, it will still have higher marginal costs than an F ﬁrm and remain out of the market.
12Recall that in this small open economy, capital ﬂows from abroad until the return of investment equals the
interest rate. Segmented capital markets imply that, in equilibrium, the return of foreign ﬁrms’ investments equalizes
the exogenous international interest rate, and the return of domestic ﬁrms’ investments equalizes the international
interest rate plus the tax. Equations (1) take into account these relationships.
9Unlike foreign ﬁrms, equation (3) shows that markups of H ﬁrms are reduced by the asymmetric
access to capital markets. For a domestic ﬁrm, capital controls work as a ﬁnancial burden. Even
if an H ﬁrm manages to overtake its foreign rival’s technology, it still faces higher borrowing costs.
The greater borrowing costs limit its ability to set higher prices and, thus, its markups.
Similarly, before producing, home ﬁrms choose their innovation intensities so as to maximize
their expected proﬁts net of innovation costs. That is,
Maxx(H,j) x(H,j) Π
post
(H,j) − wΓ(x(H,j)) (4)
Firms’ optimal innovation intensities, xo
(F) and xo
(H), after maximizing (2) and (4) are given by:
xo
(F) =
1
τ
φ(1 − λ−1)
w
Y xo
(H) =
φ(1 − τ λ−1)
w
Y (5)
Equations (5) show that both ﬁrms’ optimal innovation intensities are reduced by the asymmetric
access to international capital markets. Note that ﬁrms’ innovation intensities are constant across
industries and they only diﬀer with ﬁrms’ borrowing costs (τ). As the technology gap between
foreign and home ﬁrms in each industry is the only industry-speciﬁc payoﬀ-relevant variable, to
simplify notation I drop the dependence on industry j and denote each industry as a function of the
productivity gap. In this model, aggregate productivity growth is deﬁned as the growth between
the start and the end of the period. As each innovation raises productivity by a factor of λ and
home and foreign ﬁrms innovate at rates xo
(H) and xo
(F), aggregate productivity growth during this
period is given by,13
gq = ln(λ) (xo
(F) + xo
(H)) (6)
From equation (6), it is clear to see that, as both foreign and domestic ﬁrms undertake fewer inno-
vation activities, the economy grows at a lower rate.
-Capital Controls, Competition and Innovation
Equations (5) illustrate that capital controls creating asymmetries in the access to international
capital markets reduce both foreign and domestic ﬁrms’ innovation eﬀorts. However, the origin
of this decrease diﬀers in each case. For foreign ﬁrms, their preferential access to international
funds oﬀers them ﬁnancial rents that reduce their incremental proﬁts from innovating and, thus,
their innovation incentives. Intuitively, when these ﬁrms are active in equilibrium, the diﬀerence
in borrowing costs allows them to set higher monopolistic prices. The lower extent of their pro-
duction activities reduces their innovation incentives aimed at decreasing their production costs.
13To see this, note that aggregate productivity at the beginning of the period is lnQ
initial =
R 1
0 ln(q(j))dj. The
increase in aggregate productivity during the period, (x
o
(H) + x
o
(F))ln(λ), is determined by the rate of both home
and foreign ﬁrms advancing in the technological frontier. Therefore, aggregate productivity at the end of the period
becomes lnQ
end = (x
o
(H)+x
o
(F))ln(λ)+lnQ
initial. The diﬀerence between productivity at the end and at the beginning
of the period gives equation (6).
10For domestic ﬁrms, it is the greater borrowing costs they face that reduces their post-innovation
proﬁts and, in turn, their incentives to undertake innovation activities. Therefore, capital controls
reduce innovation eﬀorts of both foreign and domestic ﬁrms and, thus, their aggregate productivity
growth.
To understand the intuition of the mechanism implied by the model, it is useful to think of a
case in which the tax rate is such that innovation activities are unproﬁtable for home ﬁrms. This is
the case when τ > λ.14 In this case, even if the domestic ﬁrm succeeds in obtaining state-of-the-art
technology, it still has greater marginal costs than its foreign rival and, hence, is unable to com-
pete in the market. Therefore, domestic ﬁrms have no incentive to undertake innovation activities.
Under this framework, only foreign ﬁrms are active in equilibrium, and domestic ﬁrms just restrict
their price-setting behavior. Importantly, the larger the diﬀerence in the access to international
capital markets, the greater foreign ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial rents and the lower their innovation intensities
and aggregate growth.15
2.3 The Model’s Qualitative Predictions
Through the lens of the model, the deregulation of international capital ﬂows can be seen as a
reduction in the tax rate. This implies a decrease in the diﬀerence in the borrowing costs for home
and foreign ﬁrms, i.e. τ. To analyze the eﬀect of the deregulation of international ﬁnancial ﬂows, I
take derivatives with respect to τ of the main outcomes. In this way, I compare two steady states
with high and low levels of capital controls.
As I show below, by facilitating access to capital markets for home ﬁrms, the deregulation of
international capital ﬂows deepens market competition and promotes ﬁrms’ innovation activities.
More precisely, the fall in the cost of capital raises domestic ﬁrms’ post-innovation rents and, there-
fore, their innovation eﬀorts. In turn, the decrease in the diﬀerence in borrowing costs increases
foreign ﬁrms’ proﬁts from innovating and, thus, their incentives to undertake innovation activities.
Since the expansion in the innovation intensities is greater for domestic ﬁrms, their technology gap
with foreign competitors declines. This fall is larger in sectors where the initial gap was greater.
Greater innovation intensities accelerate aggregate productivity growth. Propositions 1-4 formally
state these eﬀects. Finally note that throughout this section, I assume that λ > τ so innovation is
14Note that domestic ﬁrms’ post-innovation proﬁts are Π
post
(H) = (1 − ξ
−1
(H))Y = (1 −
τ
λ)Y . Then if τ > λ, home
ﬁrms’ post-innovation proﬁts would be negative.
15Note that I assume workers are able to insure against the innovation risk, as in Peters (2012). This could be
implemented through a mutual fund consisting of a continuum of risk-neutral workers. After being paid, workers
deposit their wage payments in the fund and divide them equally among themselves.
11proﬁtable for both domestic and foreign ﬁrms, and they both undertake innovation activities.1617
Proposition 1: Firms’ innovation intensities. By reducing the asymmetry in the access to
capital markets (decreases in τ), ﬁnancial liberalization increases all ﬁrms’ innovation intensities.
Notably, innovation intensities increase relatively more for domestic ﬁrms.
Proof: In equilibrium, from equations in (5),
∂xo
(F)
∂τ < 0 and
∂xo
(H)
∂τ < 0. Furthermore, |
∂xo
(F)
∂τ |
<|
∂xo
(H)
∂τ |.
Proposition 1 states that innovation intensities increase for both domestic and foreign ﬁrms; how-
ever, the reasons for this expansion are diﬀerent. The reduction in the asymmetric access to capital
markets decreases foreign ﬁrms’ ability to set higher prices and, therefore, to obtain ﬁnancial rents.
It is this fall that encourages them to innovate more. More precisely, a lower ability to set prices
reduces both post- and pre-innovation proﬁts. However, pre-innovation proﬁts fall more. Since for-
eign ﬁrms’ innovation incentives depend on the diﬀerence between post- and pre-innovation proﬁts,
this diﬀerential fall increases their proﬁts from innovation activities.18 Pre-innovation proﬁts fall
more because foreign ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial rents aﬀect proﬁts more when they are technologically closer
to their local competitors. For home ﬁrms, it is the better access to capital markets that raises
their post-innovation rents and, thus, their incentives to undertake innovation activities. Since the
distortion discourages domestic ﬁrms’ innovation intensities the most, its reduction induces a larger
expansion in their innovation activities.
Proposition 2: Foreign ﬁrms’ markups. A decrease in τ reduces foreign ﬁrms’ markups.
Proof: At the end of the period, a foreign ﬁrm’s markup will be

    
    
ξ
post
(F,∆) with probability xo
(F)
0 with probability xo
(H)
ξ
pre
(F,∆) with probability (1 − xo
(F) − xo
(H))
(7)
16I assume an additional technical restriction on λ < 2. This assumption is common in the literature. The
parameter λ is related with the frequency of the innovations: the closer λ is to one, more frequent are innovations.
Stokey (1995) observes that if innovations occur every few years, a reasonable value for λ would be between 1.02-1.04;
if they occur only a couple of times per century, λ would be between a range of 1.25-1.50. The estimations of Bloom,
Schankerman, and Reenen (2012), from a panel data from US ﬁrms, imply a λ ≈ 1.06. Acemoglu and Akcigit (2011)
parameterize λ on 1.05.
17See the appendix for detailed proofs of the propositions.
18This mechanism is analogous to the "escape competition" eﬀect studied by Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth,
and Howitt (2005).
12Under the law of large numbers, a continuum of industries ensures that the foreign ﬁrm’s markup
will be equal to its expected value. More precisely,
ξe
(F,∆) = τ λ∆+1x(F) + τ λ∆(1 − x(F) + x(H))
Then,
∂ξe
(F,∆)
∂τ > 0. Intuitively, the pro-competitive forces at play reduce foreign ﬁrms’ markups in
two ways. First, the decrease in their preferential access to capital markets undermines their abil-
ity to set higher prices and, hence, their ﬁnancial rents. Second, more favorable credit conditions
encourage domestic ﬁrms to undertake greater innovation eﬀorts, which reduce the technology gap
with their foreign rivals.
Proposition 3: Change in the productivity gap and its initial level. Reductions in τ lead
to a negative relationship between the change in the technology gap between foreign and home ﬁrms
and its initial level.
Proof: At the end of the period, ∂∆e
∂τ∂∆ > 0, where ∆e is the expected technology gap in the
sector and is equal to ∆ + xo
(F) − (1 + ∆)xo
(H). Greater innovation intensities of domestic ﬁrms
imply that they overtake their foreign rivals’ technology levels. The decrease in the productivity
diﬀerence will therefore be larger in sectors where foreign ﬁrms are far ahead of domestic producers.
Proposition 4: Aggregate productivity growth. Declines in τ increase aggregate productivity
growth.
Proof: From equations (5) and (6),
∂gq
∂τ < 0.
The intuition in proposition 4 is simple: as both ﬁrms increase their innovation activities, innova-
tion, and thus aggregate productivity growth, increase.
The new result of the model is that, by removing asymmetries in the access to capital markets,
ﬁnancial openness promotes all ﬁrms’ investments in technology. What makes innovation more
proﬁtable is not only the improvement of credit conditions for home ﬁrms, but also the more com-
petitive environment faced by their foreign rivals. It is important to note that this simple exercise
departs from any consideration of speciﬁc credit constraints for innovation activities. If, in addition,
domestic ﬁrms faced tighter credit constraints to innovate than foreign ﬁrms, the results presented
in this section would be even stronger for domestic ﬁrms.19
19One way to think of this is to consider that ﬁrms pay their inputs for both production and innovation activities
in the beginning of the period. To pay them, ﬁrms raise external funds. As I show formally in Appendix B, ﬁrms’
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This paper analyzes the impact of ﬁrm-level distortions in capital markets on competition and
on investments in technology. The model above has illustrated that capital controls, generating
asymmetries in the access to foreign funds, can undermine both of these. A comparative static ex-
ercise has shown that the removal of these distortions can yield pro-competitive forces and promote
ﬁrms’ investments in technology. In the next sections, I use a particular deregulation episode -the
liberalization of international ﬂows in Hungary in 2001- to test the model’s implications against
the data.
Countries implement capital controls to regulate ﬁnancial ﬂows into and out of the economy.
Regulations in the foreign exchange (FX) market are one of these controls, as they limit the extent
to which agents are able to acquire foreign currency, hedge the exchange rate risk and, therefore,
conduct international ﬁnancial transactions. For these reasons, FX controls are reported by the IMF
in its Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) as one of
the restrictions on capital ﬂows. In Hungary, regulations in the FX market were the main capital
control tool. In 2001, with a view to joining the European Union, regulations in the FX market
were lifted and, with this, the deregulation of international ﬁnancial ﬂows was fully achieved.20 The
extent of this reform is captured by the standard indexes of ﬁnancial liberalization. For example, in
Chinn and Ito (2008)’s index the degree of capital account openness rises by 35%, and in Schindler
(2009) the level of capital controls declines by 83%.
Until 2001, foreign exchange operations in Hungary were regulated by the Act XCV of 1995.
This Act used two main tools to limit ﬁnancial transactions in foreign currency. First, it banned
all forward instruments between the Hungarian forint (HUF) and foreign currencies -chieﬂy among
them, FX swaps, and forward and future contracts. These forward contracts are main tools to
raise foreign funds as they allow agents to hedge against currency depreciations. Lacking these
instruments, agents are exposed to the currency risk. Second, it imposed important regulations on
the spot market that limited the availability of foreign currencies and the extent to which agents
could exchange them.21 These regulations on spot transactions resulted in a small and illiquid
optimal innovation intensities, equations (5), would be divided by their respective interest rates. Since domestic ﬁrms
pay a higher interest rate, their innovation intensities would be more aﬀected. The reduction in capital controls would
reduce the domestic interest rate and, in turn, foster home ﬁrms’ innovation intensities relatively more.
20In accordance with the 1993 Copenhagen Criteria, EU membership requires that countries ensure free movement
of capital. The complete deregulation of international ﬁnancial ﬂows was the only missing requirement that Hungary
had to accomplish to fulﬁll these criteria. It is important to note that major reforms such as trade openness, FDI
liberalization, banking deregulation, privatization of public companies, and changes in the competition policies had
already taken place by early nineties (see section 5.2 for a detailed discussion).
21Under this Act, only authorized ﬁnancial institutions and for authorized transactions could conduct operations
in foreign currency. In addition, the regulations prevented non-resident agents from undertaking foreign exchange
transactions in the local market. This last restriction had important consequences on the liquidity of the FX market,
as these agents (principally, foreign pension and mutual funds) are big suppliers of foreign savings into the economy.
Finally, there were important limitations on ﬁnancial transactions in foreign currency for ﬁrms and households. For
example, only after reporting income from abroad, resident ﬁrms could open bank accounts in foreign currency.
14FX market. By binding the spot and forward FX markets, the Act XCV thus severely limited
international ﬁnancial ﬂows.
The local ﬁnancial sector was crucially aﬀected by these regulations. As shown by previous
studies (Smith and Walter 2003, and Caballero, Cowan, and Kearns 2004 among others), regula-
tions on FX markets discourage banks from raising funds abroad. This was the case of ﬁnancial
institutions in Hungary under the Act XCV. The controls on the spot market and the ban on for-
ward contracts made banks reluctant to borrow internationally and prompted them to base their
credit supply on domestic savings.22 This reliance of banks on local savings led to a low level of
ﬁnancial development, as shown by two key indicators. In 2000, Hungary’s credit-to-GDP ratio
(0.27) was three times smaller than the OECD average (0.86), and its credit-to-deposit ratio was
a third lower (0.83 against 1.2 in OECD countries). The level of this latter ratio denotes the low
extent of ﬁnancial intermediation: the credit supply was signiﬁcantly smaller than the amount of
savings held locally.
Importantly, the regulations in the FX market signiﬁcantly aﬀected ﬁrms’ ability to raise foreign
funds. More precisely, they divided ﬁrms into two groups: those that were constrained by the local
regulations, and those that could circumvent these regulations by directly accessing foreign funds.
On the one hand, there were domestic ﬁrms, for which FX controls limited their foreign loans.
Two reasons explain the lack of foreign loans to these ﬁrms. First, inasmuch they faced serious
obstacles to acquire foreign currency and could not hedge movements in the exchange rate, they
were themselves discouraged from using this type of funding. Second, ﬁnancial institutions were also
reluctant to oﬀer them this type of loan, as they were considered highly risky under the regulations
in force. In this context, domestic ﬁrms limited their ﬁnancing to local credits in the national
currency. On the other hand, there were foreign companies that, unlike domestic ﬁrms, could
avoid the local restrictions by directly obtaining international funds. Although there is no precise
record indicating the exact amount of foreign indebtedness at the ﬁrm level, there is substantial
evidence that foreign ﬁrms used these funds intensively. As reported by IMF (1998), these ﬁrms
employed two main sources of international funds. First, they enjoyed the relationship between
the parent company and its banks to access to foreign bank credit.23 Second, they intensively
used internal capital markets with their parent companies. As is well established in the literature
(Desai, Foley, and Hines 2003; and Desai, Foley, and Forbes 2008, among others), this use of internal
capital markets oﬀers foreign ﬁrms ﬁnancial advantages relative to their local competitors. Thus,
by exploiting these two channels, foreign ﬁrms enjoyed access to international capital markets.
22It is important to note that the absence of ﬁnancial instruments to hedge currency risk not only discouraged
banks from raising international funds to lend in local currency, but also in foreign currency. This is because by
allowing hedging the currency risk, ﬁnancial derivatives also allow extending the maturity of loans. To see this,
consider a bank that obtains foreign funds for a length of three years. This bank would grant this loan up to three
years. If it granted it for more years, at the end of the third year it would have to use domestic deposits to pay back
its liability. As domestic deposits are in local currency, the bank would be exposed to exchange rate ﬂuctuations.
23The link between the parent company and its bank was highly used by subsidiaries in transition economies, as
it helped them avoiding the local ﬁnancial imperfections and allowed beneﬁting from international credit conditions.
See for example Weller and Scher (1999) and Weller and Scher (2001).
15In this way, FX controls created asymmetries in the access to international borrowing between
foreign and domestic ﬁrms. Whereas the former would have access to foreign funds, domestic
ﬁrms would only ﬁnance themselves locally, in a tighter credit market. In Section 5, I exploit
this asymmetry prior to the reform to investigate the diﬀerential impact of the deregulation of
international ﬁnancial ﬂows between home and foreign ﬁrms.
The asymmetry in the access to capital markets was reﬂected in diﬀerences in the level of ﬁrms’
bank indebtedness. Data from the National Bank of Hungary reveals that, before the liberalization,
the short-term loans-to-sales ratio was more than a third lower for domestic ﬁrms.24 In addition,
the BEEPS survey indicates that in 2001 - the year of the reform - less than 5% of domestic ﬁrms
could obtain credit in a foreign currency.25 The survey also reveals that credit conditions were also
tighter for domestic ﬁrms. They paid interest rates 2.5 percentage points higher than foreign ﬁrms,
and the required value of the collateral on total debt was 58% greater (see Table 1).26
In 2001, the regulations on foreign exchange transactions were lifted. Crucially, the Act XCIII
removed all restrictions in the spot market and allowed forward instruments between the HUF
and foreign currencies. This deregulation of the forward market enabled the emergence of ﬁnancial
instruments aimed at hedging the currency risk. Under the new framework, international borrowing
became more attractive, particularly for ﬁnancial institutions. Thereafter, banks could raise funds
abroad at lower interest rates and use derivatives to hedge the exchange rate risk. As a result,
they substantially increased their foreign funding.27 Comparing the three years preceding and
following the reform (1998-2004), net capital inﬂows of ﬁnancial institutions rose from 0.6 to 3.3
billion US dollars per year (Figure 1, left chart). This expansion had a substantial impact on their
external debt, which by 2004 had more than tripled (Figure 1, right chart). In parallel, banks
started employing intensively ﬁnancial derivatives. Both cross-border and local derivatives soared
following the deregulation (Figures 2 and 3). As Figure 3 illustrates, the expansion of the turnover
in the local FX market is mostly explained by FX swaps.28
The increase in banks’ liquidity yielded an expansion of the credit supply. Table 1 shows that,
three years after the reform, the credit-to-GDP ratio had doubled and the credit-to-deposit ratio
24This information comes from ﬁrms’ balance sheets of the APEH database that I use in the empirical section.
Unfortunately, there is no information on the total amount of ﬁrms’ debt with banks, only short-term loans are
reported. I present the database with more detailed in Section 4.
25In a similar vein, data from the National Bank of Hungary reveals that, in 2000, credit in foreign currency was
only granted to large ﬁrms (Table 1).
26This information comes from the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) of the
World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Unfortunately, these surveys do not report
ﬁrms’ credit conditions before 2001, and therefore do not allow knowledge of their characteristics in the years prior
to the reform. See Section 4 for further details.
27Most of the ﬁrms did not have direct access to international credit markets. According to data from the National
Bank of Hungary, less than 100 ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector enjoyed some kind of transaction with non-resident
ﬁnancial institutions in 2004, of which only ten were domestic companies.
28This increase in global banking operations had a large impact at aggregate level. Overall, the economy became
much more integrated with the rest of the world. By 2004, total capital inﬂows of the ﬁnancial account had doubled
(Figure 6, left chart) and the net foreign asset position had deteriorated by 25 percentage points (Figure 6, right
chart).
16had grown by more than a third.29 It is important to note that the sum of granted credit exceeded
domestic deposits, suggesting that banks used sources of funding other than local savings (i.e.
international borrowing). In turn, the expansion of the credit supply led to a decrease in the
lending interest rate (row 3 of Table 1).
Critically, the expansion of the credit supply substantially improved credit conditions for domes-
tic ﬁrms. According to the BEEPS survey, by 2004, the interest rate diﬀerential between domestic
and foreign ﬁrms had fallen three-fold from 0.22 to 0.07, and the diﬀerence in the value of the
required collateral had dropped four-fold from 0.58 to 0.11 (rows 5 and 6 of Table 1). In addi-
tion, data from the National Bank of Hungary reveals that small and medium enterprises (SME)
increased their proportion of total credits by 15 percentage points. In this way, the deregulation
of international ﬁnancial ﬂows in Hungary improved credit conditions for domestic ﬁrms. In the
next sections, I study how this decrease in the asymmetric access to capital markets aﬀected ﬁrms’
investment in technology and market competition.
4 Data
I test the model’s predictions using two ﬁrm-level databases: APEH, which contains data on ﬁrms’
balance sheets reported to the tax authorities and is provided by the Statistical Department of the
National Bank of Hungary, and the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys
(BEEPS) of the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
The APEH database covers the population of manufacturing ﬁrms and spans the period 1992-
2008. Firm size varies signiﬁcantly in the database, spanning from single-employee ﬁrms to corpo-
rations employing thousands of workers. The database is mainly populated by small ﬁrms: from a
total of 25,286 ﬁrms, only 30% reported more than ten employees in 2001.
This database contains information on value added, sales, output, stock of capital, employment,
wages, materials, exports, and ownership structure. I use these variables to construct ﬁrms’ capital
intensity (capital per worker), labor productivity (value added per worker), RTFP, markup, and
ownership status. The RTFP measure is computed using the Olley and Pakes (1996) method to
estimate the parameters of the production function. To obtain real values, I use price indexes
at four-digit NACE industries for materials, investment, value added, and production. I estimate
markups as a wedge between the ﬁrm’s labor share and the labor elasticity of production.30 Fol-
lowing the standard literature, I deﬁne a ﬁrm as foreign if more than 10% of their shares belong to
foreign owners. From 1999, ﬁrms were asked to report short-term debt undertaken with ﬁnancial
institutions. I use this information to assess changes in ﬁrms’ indebtedness, which I proxy with the
short-term debt-to-sales ratio. Unfortunately, since providing this information is optional, only few
ﬁrms ﬁlled it in and the sample of non-missing observations shrinks by approximately 50%.
29To be consistent with my empirical analysis of Section 5, I present the values for the three years following the
reform (2004). It is worth remarking that ﬁnancial deepening continued throughout the decade.
30I will discuss this measure in Section 5.5. See also De Loecker and Warzynski (2012).
17In Sections 5.3 and 5.4, I focus my analysis on a balanced panel of 5,548 ﬁrms present over the
period 1998-2004 and for which there is information on output, employment, materials and capital
so as to compute the RTFP measure. Since smaller ﬁrms are more subject to measurement error
problems, I retain ﬁrms with ﬁve or more employees. The balanced panel accounts for 77% of value
added and 70% of employment in the manufacturing sector. In Sections 5.6 and 5.7, I analyze the
impact of the deregulation of international ﬁnancial ﬂows across the entire population of ﬁrms. I
use the years prior and following the reform to control for pre-exiting trends, and to test for a
structural break in 2001.
I assess changes in ﬁrms’ innovation activities using the BEEPS surveys. Speciﬁcally, I use
the surveys from 2002 and 2005, corresponding to the years 2001 and 2004, for Hungary. These
surveys provide information of all economic activities, excluding sectors subject to government price
regulation and prudential supervision, and employ stratiﬁed random sampling to ensure that they
are representative of the population of ﬁrms. The samples include very small ﬁrms with a minimum
of two employees up to ﬁrms with thousands of workers. BEEPS surveys report information on
innovation activities and ﬁrms’ expenditures in R&D for 774 ﬁrms (250 in the ﬁrst survey and 524
in the second). Regarding innovation activities, the surveys ask whether the ﬁrm has undertaken
any of the following initiatives in the last three years: successfully developed a major product line,
upgraded an existing product line, acquired a new production technology, obtained a new licensing
agreement, or obtained a new quality accreditation. All these measures of innovation follow the
recommendations of the Oslo Manual developed by the OECD and Eurostat for innovation surveys.
This deﬁnition of innovation focuses on new and improved product and processes that are “new
to the ﬁrm”,31 and this emphasis on "what is new to the ﬁrm" is of special interest to this study.
As Hungary is a developing economy, the easing of credit conditions might have encouraged more
domestic ﬁrms to adopt frontier technologies rather than develop new ones. Importantly, the
majority of ﬁrms (75%) have reported that these activities were a critical contributor to their
growth. I construct a dummy variable, hereafter Innovation, if the ﬁrm has undertaken any of
these activities. As concerns R&D, the surveys ask ﬁrms to report their expenditures in these
activities. However, since the questions regarding the level of R&D expenses are not comparable
across surveys, I construct a dummy variable if the ﬁrm reports positive R&D spending, hereafter
R&D.32 BEEPS surveys also contain information on ﬁrms’ credit conditions. In particular, ﬁrms
are asked to report the cost of loans and the value of the collateral required as a percentage of the
total loans. In Section 5, I use this information to test econometrically whether domestic ﬁrms’
credit conditions improved following the reform.
To test the ﬁnancial channel, I use data on sector dependence on external ﬁnance. These data
come from Raddatz (2006), who re-estimated the ﬁnancial dependence index of Rajan and Zingales
(1998) for US ﬁrms at the four-digit industry level. The Rajan and Zingales (1998) index measures
31See Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010), Mairesse and Mohnen (2010) for more discussion.
32While the survey in 2002 asks interviewees to report how much the company has spent as a percentage of total
sales, the 2004 survey asks for the precise amount of R&D expenditures. These diﬀerent manners to formulate the
question do not allow comparing the exact eﬀorts undertaken in R&D activities.
18the amount of investment that cannot be ﬁnanced through internal cash ﬂows.33
5 Empirics
Throughout this section, I test the predictions of the theoretical model. In Section 5.1, I present
sectoral and aggregate patterns in Hungary before the reform. In Section 5.2, I describe the iden-
tiﬁcation strategy. Section 5.3 tests whether domestic ﬁrms expanded more in terms of investment
in technology (proposition 1). In Section 5.4, I assess the mechanism proposed in this paper by
investigating whether this expansion correlates with a higher use of external ﬁnance. I also investi-
gate the presence of pro-competitive forces by evaluating whether foreign ﬁrms react to the threat
of competition. Section 5.5 evaluates the change in foreign ﬁrms’ markups (proposition 2). Section
5.6 analyzes whether changes in the productivity gap between foreign and domestic ﬁrms within
sectors are inversely related to their initial level (proposition 3). In Section 5.7, I test whether
aggregate productivity growth accelerates following the liberalization (proposition 4). Finally, I
explore the sources of aggregate TFP growth and investigate how they relate to the expansion in
ﬁrms’ productivity.
5.1 Patterns in Aggregate Data Before the Reform
As discussed in Section 3, the regulations in force prior to 2001 created asymmetries in the access
to international borrowing for foreign and domestic ﬁrms. Whereas the former would have access
to foreign funds, domestic ﬁrms would only ﬁnance themselves locally, in a tighter credit market.
A main thesis of this paper is that this distortion undermines competition. In line with this hy-
pothesis, prior to the reform the Hungarian manufacturing sector presented high levels of market
concentration. As illustrated in Table 2, foreign ﬁrms’ share in total value added was 74%, and the
Lerner index of industry concentration was high at 0.22.34 Furthermore, at the three-digit industry
level, the share of foreign ﬁrms was positively correlated with high levels of RTFP and markup
dispersions, as well as with industry concentration (Table 3).35 Importantly, by 2004, three years
following the liberalization, the share of foreign ﬁrms in value added had dropped six percentage
33More precisely, for a representative sample of US ﬁrms during the 1980s, Rajan and Zingales (1998) deﬁne need
of external ﬁnance as ﬁrms’ capital expenditures minus cash ﬂows from operations divided by capital expenditures.
Then, they use the sector median value across the 1980s to construct the dependence of external ﬁnance of each
industry at the three-digit level. As capital markets are largely advanced in the United States, this index is widely
used as a benchmark to capture the technological need for external ﬁnance of industries worldwide. Furthermore,
the use of this index avoids endogeneity concerns.
34The Lerner index is computed as the ﬁrm’s price-cost margin weighted by its market share at three-digit NACE
industries; see Appendix C for more details. See also Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth, and Howitt (2005); Nickell
(1996); and Lerner (1934).
35See Section 5.6 for a detail deﬁnition of RTFP and markup dispersions, and for the analysis of their changes at
industry-level following thee reform.
19points and the Lerner index had shrunk by 10%.36
5.2 Identiﬁcation Strategy
This section ﬁrst presents the identiﬁcation strategy of the eﬀect of the ﬁnancial liberalization on
ﬁrms’ outcomes. Next, it discusses possible concerns regarding the empirical analysis, for example:
diﬀerences in ﬁrms’ initial characteristics and previous growth trends, diﬀerences in sector patterns
of growth, sample selection and reverse causality issues.
The identiﬁcation strategy of the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization is based on the asymmetric
access to international capital markets for domestic and foreign ﬁrms prior to the reform. In
particular, my ﬁrm-level analysis exploits this source of cross-sectional variation and tests the
model’s implications in two steps. First, I estimate the diﬀerential impact of the reform on domestic
ﬁrms’ investments in technology. Second, I test the ﬁnancial channel implied in this paper, namely,
whether this expansion correlates with a greater use of external funds. To this end, I employ
another source of cross-sectional variation: sector ﬁnancial needs. This allows exploiting three
sources of diﬀerences: time, sector dependence on external ﬁnance, and ﬁrms’ access to international
borrowing prior the reform. Hence, I test the diﬀerential impact of the reform on domestic ﬁrms
conforming to their ﬁnancial needs. I also use data on indebtedness to check whether ﬁrms use
bank credit more intensively.
Diﬀerences in sector reliance on external ﬁnance also allow testing for pro-competitive forces.
That is, asymmetric access to international borrowing among rival ﬁrms should have distorted
competition more in sectors requiring external funds more intensively. Then, market competition
should deepen diﬀerentially more in those sectors. In this way, I can use variations in sector reliance
on external ﬁnance to identify the pro-competitive forces of ﬁnancial liberalization.
To identify the eﬀect of the reform, it is important to determine whether domestic and foreign
ﬁrms diﬀered in characteristics that could involve heterogeneous patterns of investment and pro-
ductivity growth. If these diﬀerences were not accounted for, the estimated coeﬃcients could be
biased. Table 4 disaggregates data into domestic and foreign ﬁrms for a balanced panel of 5,548
ﬁrms, and presents sample means in the initial year by type of ﬁrm (1998). Prior to the reform,
foreign ﬁrms were larger in terms of value added, employment, labor productivity and RTFP. In
addition, as stated in the model, they also enjoyed higher markups. Despite the fact that ﬁrms were
similar in age (the average age was 5.4 and 4.9 years for foreign and home ﬁrms, respectively), their
diﬀerence in means is statistically signiﬁcant.37 Since the diﬀerence in means in these variables is
signiﬁcant at the one percent level, in my reduced-form regressions I control for them.38
36The Herﬁndahl index, which also indicated high levels of concentration before the reform, shows a deepening of
market competition, decreasing by 7.5% (Table 2).
37This feature is important as it goes against the argument that results could be driven by the expansion of new
foreign investments in Hungary. On average, foreign ﬁrms had joined the market in the mid 1990s.
38The BEEPS survey also reveals important diﬀerences between foreign and home ﬁrms. As noticed in section 3,
prior to the reform, foreign ﬁrms enjoyed lower interest rates and the value of the required collateral was smaller. In
20A main assumption of this empirical strategy is that prior to the reform, ﬁrms shared similar
growth trends. Indeed, a ﬁrst glance at the data conﬁrms that domestic and foreign ﬁrms saw
similar pattern of growth over the ﬁve years preceding the reform (1996-2001). Figure 4 plots the
evolution of the main outcomes analyzed: labor productivity, RTFP, capital intensity, markups
and indebtedness. Values are normalized to their initial levels. Remarkably, these parallel patterns
of growth observed before the reform were reversed after it. In line with the theory proposed in
this paper, following the liberalization, the average domestic ﬁrm has grown faster in terms of
labor productivity, RTFP, capital intensity and indebtedness. Also, consistent with the model’s
predictions, foreign ﬁrms’ markups shrank faster. The analysis of the sample means conﬁrms that
the growth rates of foreign and domestic ﬁrms were not statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerent over the
ﬁve years before the deregulation (Table 6).
The previous paragraph discussed the concern over ﬁrms’ pre-existing growth trends. If domestic
ﬁrms were correlated with some industry characteristics, however, it would be necessary to control
for them so as to rule out possible sources of bias. I estimate the equations in ﬁrst diﬀerences, so
that time-invariant industry characteristics are diﬀerenced out. However, if sectors with diﬀerent
initial characteristics were on diﬀerent trends, the estimated coeﬃcient could capture some omitted
industry-level time-dependent variable. I tackle this issue in three diﬀerent ways. First, to account
for sectoral pre-existing growth trends, I include the average capital intensity and productivity
growth at the four-digit NACE industry level in Hungary before the reform (1996-1997). Second,
since sectors’ productivity might be growing at a diﬀerent pace in the global economy, I also control
for capital intensity and productivity growth rates in the United States. Third, as a robustness
test, I also consider sector-ﬁxed eﬀects at four-digit NACE industry level.
A critical hypothesis underlying the study is that the sample is not subject to selection issues;
that is, pro-competitive forces may not only aﬀect outcomes, but also the probability of a ﬁrm
being observed. If this probability diﬀered between domestic and foreign ﬁrms, the conditional
expectations on the OLS residuals would be diﬀerent from zero and the estimated coeﬃcients would
be biased (see, for example, Heckman 1974 and Heckman 1979). To assess whether this missing
data problem challenges my estimations, I check whether there are diﬀerences in the probability
of domestic and foreign ﬁrms being observed. In particular, I deﬁne a surviving ﬁrm if it existed
the year before the reform (2000) and did not exit within the three years following it. Then, I
compute the survival ratio of domestic and foreign ﬁrms and test whether there are diﬀerences in
their means. The results show no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the survival probability
of domestic and foreign ﬁrms. This suggests that this missing data problem does not aﬀect the
estimated coeﬃcients (Table 7).39
The general context of the reform and its timing make it likely to be exogenous with respect to
addition, foreign ﬁrms had higher probability of conducting innovation and R&D activities than home ﬁrms. Table 5
shows that the diﬀerences in means between foreign and home ﬁrms are statistically signiﬁcant in all these variables.
39Although the reform did not diﬀerentially aﬀect the survival probability of domestic and foreign ﬁrms, it indeed
led only more productive ﬁrms to survive. Table D1 shows that ﬁrms in the unbalanced panel are substantially
smaller and less productive. Notably, this diﬀerence remains after considering ﬁrms with more than ﬁve employees.
21the main outcomes analyzed, i.e. changes in home ﬁrms’ investments in technology. The reform was
driven by the accession of transition economies to the European Union (EU).40 The requirements
to join the EU were predetermined by the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993, and have been equal for all
accessing countries since then. In this sense, the content of the reform was exogenous to the country
political choice. Furthermore, as the agenda was jointly determined by the European Council and
the candidate countries, it is unlikely to have been driven by political pressure from Hungarian
ﬁrms.41
Even though the preceding points address the reverse causality problem, any event occurring in
the years of the reform and aﬀecting ﬁrms’ investment choices could aﬀect the estimated coeﬃcients.
To accurately identify the eﬀect of the reform, I restrict the analysis to the three years preceding
and following it. In addition, during this period no other signiﬁcant event that could aﬀect ﬁrms’
investment in technology occurred in Hungary. The economy was growing at a steady pace, with
no signiﬁcant shock during that period. Notably, real external ﬂows, as trade and foreign direct
investment, remain constant during the period under analysis.42 Also, major reforms had already
taken place during the early 1990s (such as privatization of public companies, bank deregulation or
competition laws).43 Furthermore, the EU did not require any further reform that could aﬀect the
development of the manufacturing sector. Finally, accession to the EU did not aimed at a major
economic integration with the EU. By 2001, the Hungarian economy was already deeply integrated
with the EU and particularly the manufacturing sector, whose exports to the EU accounted for
80% of total exports (see Figure 5).
5.3 Impact on Home Firms’ Investments
The model illustrated that a reduction in the distortion in the access to capital markets induced by
the liberalization fosters ﬁrms’ investments in technology. In particular, as stated in proposition 1,
domestic ﬁrms should expand relatively more. In this section, I investigate this prediction in two
steps. First, I study whether domestic ﬁrms increase more their capital and productivity. Second,
40In the late 1990s, 14 candidates initiated the negotiations to join the EU, of which only 10 joined in 2004: Czech
Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
41It is worth mentioning that, given the speed of the reform, it is unlikely that ﬁrms have anticipated it, and have
undertaken investments in advanced. In December 2000, the European Council deﬁned the timing for the accession
vote and the last requirements to be met by each candidate. The reform had to take place before the accession vote
in December 2002. Soon after the European Council meeting, in March 2001, Hungary deregulated the remaining
controls on ﬁnancial ﬂows.
42During the period preceding and following the reform, foreign direct investment remained constant, and even
showed a small slowdown in the years following the deregulation (see Figure 7). Moreover, Hungarian external trade
did not seem to have particularly suﬀered from the world recession in 2001. As shown in Figure 8, the volume of
exports and imports continued to grow during that period.
43Major privatization programs occurred in the early 1990s. By 1997, the share of public companies in manufactur-
ing value added was only 2%. Banking deregulation had already started in the 1980s, and was fully achieved in 1997.
The Competition Act entered into force in 1997. According to the Hungarian Competition Authority, the accession
to the EU did not cause a major change in this ﬁeld.
22I test whether they expand more in terms of R&D and innovation activities.
5.3.1 Investment in Capital and Productivity
I analyze the diﬀerential impact of the liberalization of international ﬁnancial ﬂows on domestic
ﬁrms’ capital and productivity using the following model:
yit = δ0Hit + δ1Tt + δ2(Hit xTt) + εit (8)
where i indexes ﬁrms, t denotes before and after the reform, H is a dummy variable for domestic
ﬁrms, T is dummy variable for the post-reform period, and y is a vector of {capital intensity, labor
productivity and RTFP}. The coeﬃcient of interest is δ2 and captures the eﬀect of the reform on
domestic ﬁrms’ outcomes.
A potential pitfall of regression (8), estimated with yearly ﬁrm-level data, is that residuals might
be serially correlated - across time within ﬁrms, and across ﬁrms within sectors for a given year.
Serial correlation in the error term might understate the OLS standard errors and induce a type II
error, i.e. accepting the null hypothesis when this is true. To account for this source of bias of the
OLS standard errors, I use one of the solutions proposed by Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan
(2004) and remove the time series dimension of the data. More precisely, I aggregate the data into
pre- and post-reform periods, deﬁned as the three years before and after the deregulation.44 The
dependent variable is computed as the average value between 1998 and 2000, and between 2002
and 2004,
∆yi = log(
1
3
2004 X
2002
yit) − log(
1
3
2000 X
1998
yit)
Equation (8) in ﬁrst diﬀerences becomes:
∆yi = δ1 + δ2Hi + ∆εi (9)
I cluster the OLS standard errors at four-digit NACE industries to take into account the corre-
lation across ﬁrms within sectors. Regression (9), in ﬁrst diﬀerences, removes ﬁrm- and sector-ﬁxed
eﬀects, and therefore controls for time unvarying unobserved characteristics at the ﬁrm and indus-
try levels. However, the ﬁxed eﬀects do not absorb individual characteristics that could lead ﬁrms
to beneﬁt diﬀerently from the introduction of the reform. When estimating equation (9), therefore,
I add a set of initial conditions at ﬁrm level, Zi, as: size (employment), productivity (RTFP), and
age at the initial year (1998). As sectors could be on diﬀerent trends, I control for pre-existing
growth trends of RTFP and capital intensity at four-digit NACE industries between 1996 and 1997
in Hungary, Xj.45 To account for diﬀerences in industry growth trends in the world economy, I
add as controls: capital intensity and TFP growth at four-digit level in the US between 1998 and
44Since the reform took place during 2001, I omit this year to avoid distorting the estimations.
45Econometric results are robust to considering longer pre-growth trends in Hungary, i.e. the period 1992-1997.
Results are also robust to using value added and labor productivity pre-growth trends.
232004, ψj.46 The ﬁnal statistical model I estimate is:
∆yij = δ1 + δ2Hi + δ3Zi + δ4Xj + δ5∆ψj + ∆εij (10)
The estimation of equation (10) by OLS is reported in Table 8. The coeﬃcient for capital
intensity estimated in the baseline speciﬁcation of column 1, where only the dummy for the domestic
ﬁrm is included as a regressor, implies a diﬀerential expansion of these ﬁrms’ capital intensity by
0.239 log points (t = 10.24). The estimated coeﬃcient is not aﬀected by the inclusion of ﬁrm-
level controls in column 2, or by the inclusion of local and global trends in column 3. Results for
labor productivity are presented in columns 4-6. The baseline speciﬁcation in column 4 indicates
a diﬀerential impact for domestic ﬁrms of 0.074 log points (t = 4.35). The inclusion of ﬁrm and
industry controls does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the estimated coeﬃcient, which stands at 0.053 log
points (t = 3.36). The estimates for RTFP conﬁrm the greater expansion in productivity for home
ﬁrms. After controlling for ﬁrm and sector characteristics, the estimated coeﬃcient in column 9
shows an increase of 0.032 logs points (t = 2.03) for domestic ﬁrms.
In Table D2, I present a full set of robustness tests. I show that these results are robust to
controls for: four-digit industry ﬁxed eﬀects (column 1), export status (column 2), wholly foreign
companies (90% of shares) (column 3), foreign ﬁrms used as export platforms (column 4), 1% of top
ﬁrms (column 5), and ﬁrms that change their ownership status between the pre- and post-reform
periods (column 6). For robustness, I also compute the RTFP using the Petrin and Levinsohn
(2011) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) methodologies to estimate the elasticities of the pro-
duction function. Table D3 conﬁrms that the results are robust to diﬀerent estimates of RTFP.
5.3.2 R&D and Innovation Activities
The BEEPS surveys report information on a cross-section of ﬁrms’ R&D and innovation activities
for the years 2001 and 2004. To evaluate the diﬀerential impact of the reform on domestic ﬁrms, I
estimate the following model,
yijt = δ0Hit + δ1Tt + δ2(Hit xTt) + δ3Zit + µj + εijt (11)
where t denotes years 2001 and 2004; T is a dummy indicating the reform period (i.e. T=1 if 2004,
and 0 otherwise) and j represents sectors, which break down into eight categories. Zit is a vector
of ﬁrm characteristics: age and size (employment).47 To control for sector-speciﬁc characteristics,
I add sector ﬁxed eﬀects: µj. I cluster the standard errors at sector level. Equation (11) with ﬁxed
eﬀects cannot be consistently estimated by probit (incidental parameters problem), so I estimate
a linear probability model. The coeﬃcient of interest is δ2, which identiﬁes the change in the
probability of domestic ﬁrms undertaking R&D and innovation activities after the reform.
46I also use output per worker at four-digit level in the United States as proxy for productivity. Since the results
remain unchanged, I only present regressions controlled for TFP.
47As few ﬁrms report data on sales, controlling for ﬁrm’s productivity (sales over employment) highly reduces the
sample. However, results (upon request) are robust to this control.
24Columns 1-3 in Table 9 report the results on R&D activities. The baseline speciﬁcation suggests
that the reform increased the probability of domestic ﬁrms undertaking R&D activities by 10.7
percentage points (t = 2.24). The estimated coeﬃcient remains stable and statistically signiﬁcant
after the inclusion of ﬁrm- and industry-level controls (columns 2 and 3). Along the same lines,
results on innovation activities in columns 4-6 also suggest that the reform increased the probability
of domestic ﬁrms conducting these activities. The coeﬃcient in the regression including all controls
(column 6) implies an increase of 12 percentage points (t = 2.19).
It is interesting to remark on the estimated coeﬃcients on the dummy for home ﬁrms prior
to the liberalization, δ0. The estimated coeﬃcient across speciﬁcations is negative, which suggests
that before the reform there was a lower probability of domestic ﬁrms undertaking both R&D and
innovation activities than foreign ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is consistent with previous studies highlight-
ing the negative impact of credit constraints on innovation activities. In particular, this is closely
related to Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2010), who report that ﬁnancial constraints restrict do-
mestic ﬁrms’ innovation activities in non-OECD countries.
The above results suggest that the deregulation of international ﬁnancial ﬂows in Hungary was
correlated with diﬀerential increases in capital intensity, productivity and probability of undertak-
ing R&D and innovation activities of domestic ﬁrms. In the next section, I investigate whether it
was the relaxation of credit conditions induced by the liberalization that encouraged ﬁrms’ expan-
sion.
5.4 Investigating the Financial Channel
This section studies whether the expansion in ﬁrms’ investments is correlated with greater exposure
to external funds, as implied by the ﬁnancial liberalization. I investigate this hypothesis through
two steps. First, I analyze whether domestic ﬁrms with a greater need of external ﬁnance beneﬁted
more from the liberalization. Additionally, I examine the presence of pro-competitive forces on
foreign ﬁrms. Second, using data on credit conditions and ﬁrms’ indebtedness, I test whether
domestic ﬁrms’ expansion is supported by a deeper use of external funds.
5.4.1 Investment in Capital and Productivity
I test the ﬁnancial channel by exploiting cross-sectional variations in sector ﬁnancial needs. That is,
I study three sources of variations: time, sector reliance on external ﬁnance, and ﬁrms’ asymmetric
access to international borrowing prior to the reform.
The use of this third cross-sectional dimension allows exploring two main implications of this
paper. First, better credit conditions should encourage domestic ﬁrms to invest more in technology.
Intuitively, this eﬀect should be greater in sectors where the needs of external ﬁnancial are larger. In
this way, I evaluate whether domestic ﬁrms in more ﬁnancially dependent sectors expand more after
the liberalization. Second, pro-competitive forces should induce foreign companies to invest more
25in technology as well. In particular, foreign ﬁrms’ responses should also vary with the exposure to
external ﬁnance. The reason is that the asymmetric access to international capital markets distorted
competition more in sectors where ﬁrms use external ﬁnance more intensively.48 Accordingly,
both ﬁrms’ productivity should expand in accordance with sector ﬁnancial needs. Notably, as the
distortion aﬀected domestic ﬁrms more (as shown in proposition 1 of the model), conditional on
the sector, domestic ﬁrms should expand more.
To evaluate these two implications, I include the cross-sectional variation in sector ﬁnancial
needs in equation (8). In particular, I consider the following model,
yit = δ0Hit + δ1Tt + δ2(Hit xTt) + δ3(FDj xTt) + δ4(Hit xFDj xTt ) + δ5FDj + εit (12)
where j denotes four-digit NACE industries and FDj is the index of external ﬁnance of Rajan and
Zingales (1998). Coeﬃcient δ3 in equation (12) captures the diﬀerential impact of the reform on
foreign ﬁrms across sectors. This is, a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient would imply that foreign
ﬁrms expanded more in sectors where the need for external ﬁnance was greater. Coeﬃcient δ4
absorbs the diﬀerential impact of the reform on domestic ﬁrms in accordance with their ﬁnancial
needs. Importantly, it indicates whether domestic ﬁrms expand more than their foreign market
rivals with the same level of reliance on external funding. In this way, equation (12) allows iden-
tifying the expansion of foreign ﬁrms and the potential diﬀerential growth of domestic ﬁrms in
accordance with sector ﬁnancial needs.
As discussed earlier, a potential pitfall of estimating equation (12) with yearly ﬁrm-level data is
that residuals could be serially correlated. To avoid serial correlation in the error term, I estimate
(12) in ﬁrst diﬀerences. After the inclusion of ﬁrm-level and sector controls, the ﬁnal model I
estimate is,
∆yij = δ1 + δ2Hi + δ3 FDj + δ4 (Hi xFDj) + δ5Zi + δ6Xj + δ7 ∆ψj + ∆εij (13)
Similarly to equation (12), coeﬃcient δ3 captures the eﬀect of the reform on foreign ﬁrms across
sectors. δ4 absorbs the diﬀerential eﬀect of domestic ﬁrms over their foreign rivals in accordance
with sector ﬁnancial needs. I control for ﬁrm-initial characteristics (size, age and productivity
in 1998) and sector pre-growth trends in Hungary (capital intensity and productivity) and global
trends (capital intensity and productivity in the US), as in equation (10). I cluster the standard
errors at four-digit NACE industries.
Columns 1-3 in Table 10 report the main results on capital intensity. The coeﬃcient on the
interaction term for home ﬁrms δ4 is statistically signiﬁcant and robust to the inclusion of ﬁrm’s
initial characteristics and local and global trends (column 3). After including all controls, the
estimated coeﬃcient implies that domestic ﬁrms expanded 0.252 log points (t = 2.02) in the average
external ﬁnancial sector, i.e. machinery and equipment (corresponding to an index of 0.27). It is
48One way to think of this through the lens of the model is to consider that sectors have diﬀerent capital intensities:
αj. Then, as τj = (1+ ˜ τ)
αj, a tax on capital imports (˜ τ) aﬀects sectors heterogeneously. From equations in (5), it is
straightforward to see that
∂xo
(F)
∂˜ τ and
∂xo
(H)
∂˜ τ increase in absolute value with αj.
26important to remark on the estimated coeﬃcient for foreign ﬁrms, δ3. This coeﬃcient is not
statistically signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation, i.e. foreign ﬁrms did not expand their capital intensity
in accordance with their needs of external ﬁnance. This result suggests that these ﬁrms might not
have been credit constrained before the liberalization.
Columns 4-6 report the results for labor productivity. The estimated coeﬃcients are consistent
with the mechanism proposed in this paper. The coeﬃcient δ3 implies an increase of 0.09 log points
(t = 2.50) of foreign ﬁrms’ labor productivity in the sector with average ﬁnancial dependence
(machinery and equipment) after the inclusion of ﬁrm- and industry-level controls in column 6. As
predicted by the model, the eﬀect is even greater for domestic ﬁrms. They diﬀerential increase in
the average sector is 0.04 log points (t = 3.17) compared with the expansion of foreign ﬁrms.
Results on RTFP conﬁrm the growth of ﬁrms’ productivity in accordance with their ﬁnancial
needs (columns 7-9). After considering all controls, the estimated coeﬃcients suggest that foreign
ﬁrms in the sector with average ﬁnancial dependence increase their RTFP by 0.07 log points (t =
3.02) (column 9). Just like the trends in labor productivity, domestic ﬁrms expanded more: in the
sector with average ﬁnancial dependence, their RTFP grew 0.04 log points (t = 2.48) above the
increase of their foreign rivals.
The expansion of foreign ﬁrms’ labor productivity and RTFP could also be interpreted as these
ﬁrms being credit constrained. To account for this possibility, I assess whether these results are
aﬀected when considering diﬀerent ownership structures. For example, one could think that ﬁrms
with larger shares of foreign ownership would enjoy tighter links with parent companies and, thus,
would be less credit constrained. If this were the case, the estimated coeﬃcient on δ3 would not
be statistically signiﬁcant. I estimate regression (13) on foreign ﬁrms with more than 50% foreign
shares. The results presented in Table D4 attest against this argument, showing that the estimated
coeﬃcient remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant. Together with the fact that foreign ﬁrms
do not increase their capital intensity, they are consistent with the interpretation of this paper that
pro-competitive forces induce foreign ﬁrms to expand their productivity.49
5.4.2 Credit Conditions and Firms’ Indebtedness
As discussed in Section 3, the liberalization of ﬁnancial ﬂows in Hungary was followed by the
expansion of the local credit supply. In this section, I ask in two steps whether this expansion ben-
eﬁted mostly domestic ﬁrms. First, I employ BEEPS survey to evaluate whether credit conditions
improved for domestic ﬁrms. Second, I use information on ﬁrms’ short-term debt from the APEH
database to investigate whether domestic ﬁrms increased their use of external funding.
The BEEPS surveys ask ﬁrms to report the interest rate paid on loans and the value of the
collateral required as a percent of the loan. I use this information as outcome variables and
examine whether these values decreased for domestic ﬁrms after the reform. Table 11 reports
49This evidence is also consistent with previous industry-level studies reporting that increases in competition induce
incumbent ﬁrms to raise their productivity (Holmes and Schmitz 2010).
27the estimated coeﬃcients of regression (11) on these outcomes. The coeﬃcient on home ﬁrms is
positive and signiﬁcant before the reform, indicating that domestic ﬁrms did indeed face tighter
credit conditions than foreign companies prior to the reform. After the inclusion of ﬁrm-level
controls and sector-ﬁxed eﬀects, the estimated coeﬃcients indicate that domestic companies paid
interest rates 3.7 percentage points (t = 3.55) higher. Likewise, the value of the required collateral
as a percentage of the total loan was 52 percentage points (t = 4.63) greater than that for foreign
companies (columns 3 and 6). As expected, the liberalization of ﬁnancial ﬂows improved credit
conditions for home ﬁrms: the coeﬃcients of both the interest rate and value of the collateral
are negative and statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. Regressions including all controls of
columns 3 and 6 illustrate that their interest rate fell by 3.9 percentage points (t = 3.67) and the
value of the collateral by 31.2 percentage points (t = 2.86).
I examine changes in ﬁrms’ indebtedness by using APEH database to estimate regression (10)
on the debt-to-sales ratio. The results presented in Table 6 conﬁrm that domestic ﬁrms use bank
indebtedness more intensively after the reform. The baseline regression, where only a dummy for
domestic ﬁrm is included, indicates a diﬀerential increase of 0.16 log points (t = 2.17) for the
average domestic ﬁrm (column 1). The inclusion of ﬁrm- and industry-level controls suggests a
slightly larger increase of 0.23 log points (t = 2.61). I assess the mechanism proposed in this paper
using equation (13) on ﬁrms’ indebtedness. Column 4 shows that, as expected, the increase in
indebtedness is larger for ﬁrms with greater ﬁnancial needs. In the average ﬁnancially dependent
sector (i.e. machinery and equipment), domestic ﬁrms enjoyed an even greater expansion of 0.14
log points (t = 1.98). It is worth noting that foreign ﬁrms did not increase their indebtedness in
accordance with sector ﬁnancial needs. Instead, the estimated coeﬃcient is negative and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. This decrease could indicate a reallocation of ﬁnancial funds towards domestic
ﬁrms, as it was suggested in line 4 of Table 1.
Throughout this section, I have investigated the channel implied in this paper. This is, whether
the expansion in domestic ﬁrms’ productivity correlates with a greater use of external funds. I
have tested this channel in two steps. First, I have shown that domestic ﬁrms with greater ﬁnan-
cial needs increased their capital intensity, productivity and RTFP more. Second, I have provided
direct evidence of this ﬁnancial channel. I have illustrated that credit conditions improved substan-
tially for domestic ﬁrms after the liberalization, and that they expanded their indebtedness ratio
accordingly. As expected, the upsurge in the indebtedness ratio was greater for domestic ﬁrms in
more ﬁnancially dependent sectors. In addition, I have reported the presence of pro-competitive
forces. The empirical results indicate that in sectors where asymmetric access to capital markets
distorted competition more, foreign ﬁrms’ productivity increased diﬀerentially. In the next section,
I advance the analysis of pro-competitive forces by studying changes in ﬁrms’ markups.
285.5 Foreign Firms’ Markups
As illustrated by the model, ﬁrms’ markups are proportional to the productivity advantage and
the diﬀerence in ﬁrms’ borrowing costs. Financial liberalization aﬀects both of these. In particular,
the second implication of the model stated that capital openness should reduce foreign ﬁrms’
markup through these two sources. First, less distorted capital markets decrease their market power
and thus their ability to charge higher prices. Second, their technological advantage decreases as
domestic ﬁrms invest more in technology. Accordingly, foreign ﬁrms’ markups should decrease after
the reform. In this section, I test this prediction.
To compute markups, I follow De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and derive them from the
ﬁrm’s optimal labor demand equation,
w(t) l(i,j,t) = βj y(i,j,t)

w(t)
β
β
R(t)
α
α
q(i,j,t)
ξ(i,j,t) =
1
θ(i,j,t)
βj (14)
where l is the ﬁrm’s optimal labor demand and y is its production; βj is the estimated labor
elasticity of the production function in sector j50; w denotes the wage and R the interest rate;
q expresses ﬁrm’s productivity; and θ represents the ﬁrm’s labor share. As shown in equation
(14), markups ξ are deﬁned as a wedge between the ﬁrm’s labor share and the labor elasticity of
production. Then, I test for the diﬀerential decline in foreign ﬁrms’ markups using the following
model,
∆ξij = δ1 + δ2Fi + δ3Zi + δ4Xj + δ5∆ψj + ∆εij (15)
where Fi is a dummy for foreign ﬁrms. δ2 captures the diﬀerential eﬀect on foreign ﬁrms’ markups.
I control for ﬁrms’ initial characteristics, local and global trends, and cluster the standard errors
at the four-digit industry level as in equation (10).
Column 1 in Table 13 regresses changes in markups on a dummy for a foreign ﬁrm. As predicted
by the model, the estimated coeﬃcient illustrates a greater decrease of foreign ﬁrms’ markups of
0.017 log points (t = 1.9) relative to domestic ﬁrms. The inclusion of ﬁrm- and industry-level
controls does not signiﬁcantly alter the results: on average, foreign ﬁrms’ markups drop by 0.026
log points (t = 2.26). This relative decrease of foreign ﬁrms’ markups is consistent with the evidence
presented in the previous sections and the model’s implications. As domestic ﬁrms increase their
productivity relative to foreign ﬁrms, foreign ﬁrms’ cost advantage decreases and, therefore, their
markups fall relatively more. Note as well that the magnitude of the relative drop in foreign
50Recall that in the model, β = 1 − α. See details in Appendix C on the estimation of the elasticities of the
production function.
29ﬁrms’ markups (0.026 log points) is in line with the relative increase in domestic ﬁrms’ RTFP
(0.032 log points). For robustness, I also compute markups using the elasticities of the production
function estimated with the Petrin and Levinsohn (2011) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012)
methodologies. Table D3 conﬁrms these patterns. Results are also robust to using the price-cost
margin as a proxy for markups (see column 3 of Table D3).
It is important to note that the asymmetries in the access to capital markets should aﬀect
foreign ﬁrms’ markups more in sectors with greater ﬁnancial needs. As ﬁrms in those sectors use
external funds more intensively, the diﬀerence in the borrowing costs should oﬀer foreign ﬁrms
greater market power and distort domestic ﬁrms’ investments in technology more. To assess this
implication, I test whether foreign ﬁrms’ markups in these sectors decrease more by interacting the
dummy for foreign ﬁrms with the ﬁnancial dependence index of Rajan and Zingales (1998). The
estimated equation is,
∆yij = δ1 + δ2Fi + δ3 FDj + δ4 (Fi xFDj) + δ5Zi + δ6Xj + δ7 ∆ψj + ∆εij (16)
where δ4 absorbs the diﬀerential eﬀect on foreign ﬁrms in more ﬁnancially dependent sectors. The
estimated coeﬃcients are reported in column 4 of Table 13. As expected, the reform produced a
relatively greater decline in foreign ﬁrms’ markups in sectors with higher needs for external ﬁnance.
In the average ﬁnancially dependent sector (machinery and equipment) their markups fell by 0.05
log points (t = 4.74). Note that this greater decline of foreign ﬁrms’ markups in more ﬁnancially
dependent sectors is consistent with the greater expansion of domestic ﬁrms in those sectors. It
is interesting that the coeﬃcient on ﬁnancial dependence for domestic ﬁrms δ3 is positive and sig-
niﬁcant, suggesting that their markups rose in sectors with higher ﬁnancial needs. This result is
in line with their greater expansion in productivity observed in those sectors. As domestic ﬁrms’
productivity grew more, so did their markups.
Firm-Level Evidence: Taking Stock
The main hypothesis of this paper is that by removing distortions in capital markets, ﬁnancial
liberalization promotes competition and encourages ﬁrms’ investments in technology. Throughout
this section, I have presented two sets of results supporting this argument. First, I have shown that
the deregulation of international ﬁnancial ﬂows in Hungary is associated with increases in domestic
ﬁrms’ capital intensity, labor productivity and RTFP. These results are consistent with a rise in
their probability of undertaking R&D and innovation activities. Additionally, using cross-sectional
variations in terms of sector ﬁnancial needs, I have illustrated that domestic ﬁrms with a greater
need of external ﬁnance expanded the most after the liberalization. I have provided direct evidence
that their expansion is associated with an improvement in credit conditions and greater use of
bank credit. The rise in their debt-to-sales ratio reﬂects this. In this way, better credit conditions
following the reform seem to have encouraged domestic ﬁrms to invest in technology. Second, the
empirical results also point to the presence of pro-competitive forces. In sectors where the asym-
metric access to international borrowing distorted competition more, ﬁrms already enjoying access
30to foreign funds increased their labor productivity and RTFP more. Notably, these ﬁrms did not
increase their capital intensity nor their indebtedness in accordance with their exposure to external
ﬁnance. In addition, their markups decreased regarding their domestic competitors. Importantly,
this decline was larger in sectors with greater ﬁnancial needs. As domestic ﬁrms’ RTFP increased
relatively more in those sectors, foreign ﬁrms’ cost advantage fell more and so did their markups.
In this way, reductions in distortions in the access to capital markets are associated with tougher
competition.
5.6 Industry-Level Evidence: Technological Gap and Concentration
The model states that the greater increase in domestic ﬁrms’ innovation eﬀorts yields a decline in
the productivity gap with their foreign rivals. In particular, proposition 3 predicts that this decline
is greater in sectors where the initial productivity gap is largest. In this section, I assess the validity
of this proposition and investigate whether this decline works together with changes in the industry
concentration.
Proposition 3 refers to the gap in physical productivity between foreign and domestic ﬁrms.
Unfortunately, the lack of information on ﬁrms’ prices does not allow recovering their physical
productivity and, thus, assessing this proposition directly against the data. However, through the
lens of the model two other measures reﬂecting the productivity gap can be used: markups and
RTFP. Concerning the ﬁrst measure, the model implies that ﬁrms with a greater technological
advantage set higher prices and obtain greater markups. In fact, as illustrated in equations (1)
and (3), markups are proportional to ﬁrms’ productivity advantage. As regards RTFP, it can be
shown that this measure is proportional to ﬁrms’ markups and, then, to the productivity gap.51
Therefore, I use diﬀerences in markups and RTFP between foreign and domestic ﬁrms as proxies for
the physical productivity gap. Proposition 3 can be evaluated by estimated the following regression,
∆κj = α + βκj + εj (17)
where κj denotes the markup or RTFP diﬀerence between the 50th percentile foreign and home
ﬁrms in each three-digit industry j before the reform (1998-00), and ∆ denotes the change between
before and after (1998-00 and 2002-04). A negative and statistically signiﬁcant β will support
proposition 3.
A potential drawback of regression (17) is that it does not consider pre-existing trends within
sectors. If the markup and RTFP gaps were already falling, the regression would attribute this to
the liberalization process. To account for pre-existing trends, I include a third period of analysis
1996-97, and estimate the following model:
∆κjt = α + β1κjt + β2Tt + β3(κjt ∗ Tt) + εjt (18)
where j and t denotes three-digit NACE industries and period, respectively; κjt denotes the level
at the beginning of each period (1996-97 and 1998-00); ∆κj represents the change in the variable
51More precisely, RTFPj = [(
w
1−α)
1−α(
R∗
α )
α]ξj.
31from one period to another (1996-97 to 1998-00, and 1998-00 to 2002-04); and Tt is a dummy
indicating the reform period (1998-00 and 2002-04).52 The change after the reform, taking into
account pre-existing trends, is then captured by the coeﬃcient β3 of the interaction term.
Table 14 presents the results for the dispersion of RTFP and markups. Column 2 reports
the estimation of regression (17) for the reform period. In line with proposition 3, it illustrates
a greater decrease in the RTFP gap in sectors where its initial level was larger. The estimated
coeﬃcient is -0.201 (t = 2.57) and implies that, in the sector with the average RTFP dispersion,
the gap between foreign and domestic ﬁrms fell by 21%. Note that the inclusion of pre-existing
trends, as in equation (18), does not aﬀect the estimated coeﬃcient (column 3). Column 4 reports
the estimated coeﬃcient for markups in the late 1990s. The negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient,
-0.419 (t = 6.59), suggests that the markup gap was already shrinking in highly dispersed sectors.
Remarkably, this trend accelerated after the liberalization of international ﬁnancial ﬂows: the
estimated coeﬃcient is substantially greater and statistically signiﬁcant, -0.73 (t = 5.40) (column
5). The interaction term reported in column 6 conﬁrms the larger decline in the diﬀerences in
markups after the reform.
As discussed in Section 2, asymmetric access to external ﬁnance distorts market competition.
This distortion could lead to higher levels of industry concentration. By removing distortions in
the access to capital markets, ﬁnancial liberalization deepens market competition and aﬀects in-
dustry concentration. The reduction in industry concentration, however, should be heterogeneous.
Intuitively, following the decline in the productivity gap, the fall in concentration should be larger
in sectors in which its initial level was larger.53 Following the standard literature, I use the Lerner
index as a measure of concentration.54 Column 9 in Table 14 including pre-existing trends conﬁrms
this hypothesis and shows that the reform caused a larger decrease in more concentrated sectors.
The estimated coeﬃcients imply a fall in concentration of 6% in a sector where the Lerner index
was initially 0.25 (for example, basic metals).
5.7 Aggregate Productivity Growth
In the previous sections, I have shown that the deregulation of international ﬁnancial ﬂows in Hun-
gary was associated with increases in ﬁrms’ investment in technology. Proposition 4 in the model
states that greater investments in technology should accelerate aggregate productivity growth.
In this section, I test this prediction on the population of manufacturing ﬁrms over the period
1992-2008. Next, to examine the contribution of ﬁrms’ investments in technology to aggregate
productivity growth, I break down the growth into improvements in ﬁrms’ technical eﬃciency and
52This period consists in the average of two years (1996-97), instead of three as the other two periods. I exclude
the year 1995 from the analysis, as an important downturn hit the Hungarian economy that year. Including that
year could misrepresent the actual level of dispersion.
53Recall that ﬁrms with a greater productivity advantage have lower marginal costs that allow them to capture
larger market shares.
54See Nickell 1996, Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth, and Howitt 2005, among others.
32reallocation eﬀects across ﬁrms.
To assess proposition 4, I follow Petrin and Levinsohn (2011) and deﬁne aggregate RTFP as
the diﬀerence between the aggregate value added and aggregate expenditures on labor and capital.
I normalize its value to the initial year of the database (1992), and test for a structural break in
its growth trend. In particular, I follow Perron and Zhu (2005) and estimate,
RTFPt = α + β1 Tt + β2 SBt + εt (19)
where t denotes year; T is a time-trend; and SB = year−2001 if year ≥ 2002 and 0 otherwise, and
represents the structural break in slope. Coeﬃcient β1 absorbs the time trend in aggregate RTFP,
and coeﬃcient β2 captures the change in its trend following the capital openness. Column 1 in Ta-
ble 15 reports the results of a regression where only the time trend is included. The estimation of
equation (19) is presented in column 2. The coeﬃcient β2 is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at
the one percentage point level, conﬁrming the acceleration in the RTFP growth rate after ﬁnancial
liberalization. Columns 3-5 present a set of robustness tests. Column 3 includes as a regressor a
variable absorbing changes in levels after the reform. Column 4 tests for a change in the slope of
productivity growth after the trade liberalization in 1996. Columns 5 and 6 include falsiﬁcation
tests for structural breaks in slopes in the year 1998 and the year of joining the EU (2004). None of
these controls aﬀects the estimated coeﬃcient for the acceleration of aggregate productivity growth
following the ﬁnancial liberalization.
Sources of Aggregate Productivity Growth
The results presented above associate the deregulation of international ﬁnancial ﬂows in Hungary
with an acceleration of aggregate RTFP growth. In this section, I explore the sources of this growth
and investigate how they relate to the increase in ﬁrms’ productivity reported above.
I follow Petrin and Levinsohn (2011) to estimate aggregate RTFP and study the sources of
its growth. First, I deﬁne aggregate productivity growth as the change in aggregate value added
minus the change in aggregate expenditures on labor and capital. Next, I break this down into a
component related to aggregate changes in technical eﬃciency (TE) and a component aggregating
reallocation eﬀects (RE). The technical eﬃciency component is straightforward and reﬂects the
contribution to aggregate productivity of increases in ﬁrms’ eﬃciency, holding inputs constant.
More precisely, this term is the sum of changes in ﬁrm’s RTFP weighted by the ﬁrm’s share in total
value added. The reallocation term aggregates changes in input allocation across ﬁrms. As is well
established in the literature, ﬁrm-level distortions create wedges between the input elasticities and
input shares in production.55 In the presence of these wedges, reallocation of inputs across ﬁrms
can aﬀect aggregate RTFP. In particular, the reallocation term is the sum of the net gain in the
allocation of inputs across ﬁrms weighted by the ﬁrm’s share in value added. Formally, I break
55See Restuccia and Rogerson (2008); Hsieh and Klenow (2009), among others.
33down aggregate RTFP as,56
∆RTFPt = TEt + REt =
Nt X
i,t
Dit ∆RTFPit +
Nt X
i,t
X
i,z,t
Dit(εizt − θizt)∆Zizt (20)
where i and t denote ﬁrm and year; Nt denotes the total number of ﬁrms in the economy; Dit is the
ﬁrm’s share in total value added, where the weight is computed as the average between t and t−1;
∆RTFPit is ﬁrm’s RTFP growth; Z denotes inputs: capital and labor; ε is the input elasticity;
and θ is the input share in value added.
Table 16 Panel A presents the mean growth rate of aggregate RTFP and its components in
the three years preceding and following the reform (1998-00 and 2002-04). Panel B reports the
contribution of RTFP components to aggregate growth. Remarkably, in the years before the
liberalization, within-ﬁrm productivity growth was only 1% yearly, and aggregate RTFP growth was
mostly explained by reallocation eﬀects, which accounted for 4.8% per year (columns 2 and 3). This
pattern of growth was fully reversed after the ﬁnancial liberalization. In the three years following
the reform, within-ﬁrm productivity grew at an average pace of 7.9% per year and reallocation term
decreased to 1.7% per year. Thus, in the post-reform period within-ﬁrm productivity explained the
bulk of the expansion in aggregate RTFP: 82%. Importantly, the rise in within-ﬁrm productivity
is mostly explained by the balanced panel of ﬁrms used above (column 4 of Table 16).57
What creates these two opposite patterns of growth before and after the liberalization? Or,
put diﬀerently, why did within-ﬁrm productivity grow at such a low pace before the reform and at
a high pace after it? The conjecture that emerges from this paper is that it is the change in all
ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in technology that raises it. More precisely, according to the mechanism
studied in this paper, distortions in the access to capital markets reduce competition and innovation
incentives. It is then natural that before the liberalization, within-ﬁrm productivity grew at a low
pace. Financial liberalization reduced distortions in the access to international capital markets. As
illustrated in the model, this fall in distortions encourages investments in technology by all ﬁrms;
not only do ﬁrms that gain access to international funds invest more in technology, but so do their
market rivals. It is the tougher competition that leads the latter to do so. In this way, by aﬀecting
all ﬁrms’ incentives to invest in technology, ﬁnancial liberalization can entail important changes
in within-ﬁrm productivity. Throughout this paper, I have presented ﬁrm-level evidence of this
mechanism. At the aggregate level, the expansion of within-ﬁrm productivity is also consistent
with the mechanism.
56I present in Appendix C the derivation of equation (20) in detail.
57Interesting, if market shares are held constant to the initial year (1998), the rise in within-ﬁrm productivity still
explains the bulk of the expansion in aggregate productivity of the balanced panel (more than 70%).
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Financial liberalization has been associated with increases in aggregate productivity. What are the
underlying causes of this expansion? This paper argues that this expansion is due to decreases
in distortions in capital markets that encourage ﬁrms’ investments in technology and promote
competition.
Using a simple small open economy model, I have shown that capital controls can create distor-
tions in capital markets that undermine competition and ﬁrms’ innovation incentives. By removing
these distortions, ﬁnancial liberalization triggers pro-competitive forces and encourages all ﬁrms to
increase their investments in technology. Under this framework, it is the greater innovation eﬀorts
undertaken by all ﬁrms that drive aggregate productivity growth. Unlike previous studies, I focus
on the eﬀect of ﬁnancial asymmetries on competition. As I have shown, these frictions can have
substantial eﬀects on growth, as they aﬀect not only constrained ﬁrms but also their market rivals.
I have used the deregulation of international ﬁnancial ﬂows in Hungary in 2001 to test the
implications of the model. I did so using ﬁrm-level data covering the population of manufacturing
ﬁrms over 17 years. This is the ﬁrst paper to assess the eﬀect of ﬁnancial liberalization using
such detailed information. The use of a long panel of census data is crucial because it enables
to accurately test the mechanism proposed in this paper, whilst simultaneously controlling for
pre-existing trends. The empirical results indicate that domestic ﬁrms beneﬁted greatly from the
liberalization. The improved access to credit markets allowed them to considerably increase their
investments in technology and to close the technological gap with their foreign rivals. The latter
responded to the threat of competition by also raising their investments in technology. At aggregate
level, the rise in ﬁrms’ investments in technology accelerated aggregate productivity growth by 3%
over the three years following the reform. This faster growth led Hungary to reduce its income per
capita gap with the OECD economies by more than 10%.
Once one starts to think about the impact of distortions in capital markets on competition,
other questions emerge. For example, can pro-competitive forces explain why ﬁnancial frictions on
small ﬁrms have been found to have large eﬀects on aggregate productivity? The conjecture that
follows from this paper is that if ﬁnancial frictions reduce competition, they can also discourage
large ﬁrms from upgrading their technology. Since these ﬁrms have large market shares, their
underinvestment can have sizable implications for aggregate productivity. With an international
perspective, one could ask whether these asymmetries in capital markets can help to explain the
lack of convergence of developing economies. The presence of large ﬁnancial frictions that usually
characterize these economies could damage pro-competitive forces. In this way, both the lack of
ﬁnancial opportunities and the poor competitive environment could signiﬁcantly reduce innovation
incentives and, thus, economic growth.
This paper also informs the current debate on global imbalances. It has been argued that large
amounts of capital inﬂows can destabilize growth. In response, some countries have introduced
capital controls to protect their economies. This paper warns of some potential implications of
those measures. If capital controls were to introduce asymmetries in capital markets, they could
35undermine competition and growth. Finding the right balance between the potential pitfalls of
international ﬁnancial integration and the beneﬁts of ensuring equal ﬁnancial opportunities across
ﬁrms is one of the major challenges currently faced by policy makers in developing economies.
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Figure 8: Evolution of Trade
44Table 1: Credit Market Before and After the Liberalization
Aggregate Indicators Before After
Credit-to-GDP Ratio 0.27 0.44
Credit-to-Deposit Ratio 0.83 1.13
Lending interest rate 0.13 0.07
Firms
Credits to SME 0.34 0.51
SME debt in FX 0.00 0.33
Interest rate diﬀerential b. Home and Foreign 0.22 0.07
Diﬀerential in collateral b. Home and Foreign 0.58 0.11
Notes: Rows1-5: source: National Bank of Hungary, before: December 2000, after: De-
cember 2004. Rows 6-7: Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (World
Bank and EBRD).
Table 2: Market Concentration Before and After the Reform
Before After
Share of Foreign on VA 0.74 0.68
Lerner Index 0.22 0.20
Herﬁndahl index 0.40 0.37
Table 3: Concentration, RTFP and Markup Dispersions Before the Reform
Mean RTFP Dispersion Markup Dispersion Lerner
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of Foreign Firms 0.74 0.3568*** 0.2184** 0.2394**
on Industry VA (0.0003) (0.0335) (0.0118)
N 82 82 78 82
Notes: Std. errors in parenthesis. Column 1 is the average across industries of the share of foreign owned ﬁrms on value
added. Column 2-4 are 3-digit NACE industries correlations before the reform (1998-2000). *, **, ***signiﬁcant at 10,
5, and 1 percent. Source: APEH.
45Table 4: Mean Characteristics of Home and Foreign Firms (1998)-APEH Database
Foreign Home Diﬀerence in
Means
(In logs)
Value Added 10.6549 9.0769 1.5779***
(0.0525) (0.0226) (0.0500)
Employment 3.8952 2.8602 1.0349***
(0.0429) (0.0191) (0.0418)
Labor productivity 6.7596 6.2167 0.5429***
(0.0263) (0.0131) (0.0278)
RTFP 1.4093 1.1959 0.2133***
(0.0267) (0.0139) (0.0291)
Markup 0.2391 0.1774 0.0617***
(0.0159) (0.0098) (0.0197)
Age 1.6167 1.4777 0.1390***
(0.0136) (0.0090) (0.0179)
Quantity of Firms 1,283 4,165 5,448
Notes: Std. errors in parenthesis. *, **, ***signiﬁcant at 10, 5, and 1 percent. Source: APEH.
Table 5: Mean Characteristics of Home and Foreign Firms (2001)-BEEPS Database
Foreign Home Diﬀerence in
Means
Probability of Innovation 0.5946 0.3521 0.2425***
(0.0818) (0.0328) (0.0858)
Probability of R&D 0.3206 0.1675 0.1532***
(0.0647) (0.0267) (0.0614)
Interest Rate Paid 9.0667 13.3198 -4.2531***
(0.9200) (0.5845) (1.2687)
Required Value of Collateral 124.2105 185.2874 -61.0768***
(13.7504) (11.5619) (25.6236)
Quantity of Firms 53 197 250
Notes: Std. errors in parenthesis. *, **, ***signiﬁcant at 10, 5, and 1 percent. Source: BEEPS.
46Table 6: Comparison of the Diﬀerence in Growth Rates Preceding the Reform
Balanced Panel Home Foreign Diﬀerence in Means
Capital Intensity 0.0235 0.0289 -0.0054
(0.0032) (0.0040) (0.0061)
Labor Productivity 0.0554 0.0697 -0.0143
(0.0043) (0.0074) (0.0087)
RTFP 0.0264 0.0395 -0.0132
(0.0041) (0.0071) (0.0082)
Markup -0.0076 0.0058 -0.0133*
(0.0040) (0.0068) (0.0080)
Debt/Sales -0.0077 0.0364 -0.0441
(0.0345) (0.0644) (0.0692)
N 17,765 5,654 23,419
Notes: Std. errors in parenthesis. The table reports the mean of the variable growth rate within
the ﬁve years prior to the reform (1996-2000). Source: APEH.
Table 7: Firm Survival
Firm Survival
Home Foreign Diﬀerence in Means
Survival Ratio 0.8672 0.8579 0.0092
(0.0026) (0.0060) (0.0064)
N 16,826 3,323 20,149
Notes: Std errors in parenthesis. The table reports the mean of a dummy variable on surviving after the
reform. In particular, for all existing ﬁrms prior the reform (in 2000), surviving = 1 if the ﬁrm did not exit
within the 3 years following the reform (2004), and 0 otherwise. Source: APEH.
47Table 8: Investment in Capital and Productivity
Capital Intensity Labor Productivity RTFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Home 0.239*** 0.253*** 0.252*** 0.074*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.098*** 0.032** 0.032**
(0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.016)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes
Constant 0.112*** 0.216*** 0.213*** 0.176*** 0.386*** 0.353*** 0.038** 0.402*** 0.350***
(0.018) (0.052) (0.052) (0.018) (0.037) (0.040) (0.017) (0.076) (0.042)
R2 0.019 0.030 0.030 0.004 0.027 0.040 0.008 0.075 0.088
N 5448 5448 5448 5448 5448 5448 5448 5448 5448
Notes: Std. errors are clustered at 4-digit NACE industries. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP growth
rate of the 4-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls are capital intensity
and RTFP average growth rate at 4-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm level controls are age, employment and RTFP
in the initial year (1998). Source: APEH.
Table 9: R&D and Innovation Activities
R&D Activities Innovation Activities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Home -0.153*** -0.058 -0.032 -0.242*** -0.158** -0.090
(0.028) (0.032) (0.030) (0.057) (0.054) (0.056)
Home*Reform 0.107* 0.083** 0.090* 0.176** 0.167** 0.122*
(0.048) (0.033) (0.044) (0.066) (0.055) (0.056)
Reform 0.023 0.046 0.023 -0.084 -0.071 -0.099
(0.055) (0.052) (0.043) (0.063) (0.075) (0.081)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes
Sector-ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes
R2 0.019 0.064 0.081 0.014 0.037 0.069
N 774 774 774 774 774 774
Notes: Std. errors are clustered industry level. All regressions include a constant term. R&D is a dummy if the
ﬁrm reports positive R&D expenditures. Innovation is a dummy if a ﬁrms reports any of the following activities:
developed successfully a major product line, upgraded an existing product line, acquired a new production tech-
nology, obtained a new licensing agreement, and obtained a new quality accreditation. Firm level controls are age
and size. Source: BEEPS.
48Table 10: Financial Dependence: Investment in Capital and Productivity
Capital Intensity Labor Productivity RTFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Home 0.210*** 0.221*** 0.219*** 0.058*** 0.017 0.015 0.083*** -0.010 -0.016
(0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.023)
Home * Fin. Dep. 0.142* 0.156* 0.155* 0.093* 0.155*** 0.147*** 0.087 0.181** 0.167**
(0.080) (0.076) (0.077) (0.053) (0.045) (0.046) (0.072) (0.080) (0.067)
Fin. Dep. -0.084 -0.061 -0.053 0.276** 0.320** 0.334** 0.162 0.222 0.277***
(0.064) (0.070) (0.077) (0.124) (0.124) (0.134) (0.107) (0.156) (0.092)
Constant 0.120*** 0.217*** 0.211*** 0.108** 0.334*** 0.299*** 0.001 0.373*** 0.332***
(0.021) (0.039) (0.044) (0.050) (0.076) (0.089) (0.046) (0.082) (0.050)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes
R2 0.020 0.031 0.031 0.035 0.074 0.081 0.022 0.111 0.120
N 5143 5143 5143 5143 5143 5143 5143 5143 5143
Notes: Std. errors are clustered at 4-digit NACE industries. Financial Dependence is the Rajan and Zingales’
(1998) index. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rate of the 4-digit NACE
industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls are capital intensity and RTFP
average growth rate at 4-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm level controls are age, employment and
RTFP in the initial year (1998). Source: APEH.
Table 11: Credit Market Conditions
Interest Rate Value of Collateral
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Home 4.253*** 3.707*** 3.729*** 60.789*** 49.174** 52.106***
(1.132) (1.027) (1.051) (15.391) (15.727) (11.263)
Home*Reform -3.879** -3.858*** -3.947*** -37.653* -35.438* -31.170**
(1.134) (1.018) (1.076) (17.130) (17.104) (10.911)
Reform -0.026 -0.159 -0.221 20.968 19.574 13.368
(0.951) (0.830) (0.890) (12.571) (13.192) (11.635)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes
Sector- ﬁxed eﬀects yes yes
R2 0.175 0.202 0.217 0.035 0.045 0.103
N 415 415 415 399 399 399
Notes: Std. errors are clustered industry level. All regressions include a constant term. Firm level
controls are age and size. Source: BEEPS.
49Table 12: Financial Dependence: Indebtedness
Indebtedness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Home 0.160** 0.239*** 0.230*** 0.238**
(0.073) (0.085) (0.088) (0.100)
Home* Fin. Dep. 0.526**
(0.266)
Financial Dependence -0.595**
(0.234)
Constant 0.393*** 0.085 0.105 -0.007
(0.064) (0.150) (0.161) (0.146)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes
Global trends yes yes
R2 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.015
N 2742 2742 2742 2457
Notes: Std. errors are clustered at 4-digit NACE industries. Financial Dependence is the Rajan
and Zingales (1998) index. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rate
of the 4-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls
are capital intensity and RTFP average growth rate at 4-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm
level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Source: APEH.
Table 13: Foreign Firms’ Markups
Markups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign -0.017* -0.025** -0.026** 0.030*
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016)
Foreign*Fin.Dep. -0.205***
(0.043)
Financial Dependence 0.212***
(0.069)
Constant -0.098*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.115**
(0.006) (0.025) (0.030) (0.049)
Firm-level control yes yes yes
Local trend yes yes
Global trends yes yes
R2 0.000 0.023 0.024 0.057
N 5376 5376 5376 5086
Notes: Std. errors are clustered at 4-digit NACE industries. Financial Dependence
is the Rajan and Zingales (1998) index. Global industry controls include capital
intensity and TFP growth rate of the 4-digit NACE industries in the United States
between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls are capital intensity and RTFP
average growth rate at 4-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm level controls
are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Source: APEH.
50Table 14: Markup and RTFP Dispersions and Industry Concentration
Change in RTFP Dispersion Change in Markup Dispersion Change in Concentration
Late 90s Reform Accounting for Late 90s Reform Accounting for Late 90s Reform Accounting for
Pre-
trends
Pre-
trends
Pre-
trends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Initial Value -0.076 -0.202** -0.076 -0.419*** -0.730*** -0.419*** -0.177*** -0.317*** -0.177***
(0.064) (0.079) (0.077) (0.063) (0.135) (0.079) (0.075) (0.085) (0.060)
Initial Value *T -0.222** -0.310** -0.245***
(0.107) (0.140) (0.091)
T 0.186 0.134** 0.211***
(0.128) (0.054) (0.072)
R2 0.018 0.074 0.100 0.354 0.280 0.325 0.101 0.145 0.223
N 82 82 164 78 78 156 82 82 164
Notes: all regressions include a constant. Std errors in parenthesis. 3-digit NACE industries correlations. *, **, ***signiﬁcant
at 10, 5, and 1 percent. Source: APEH.
Table 15: Acceleration of RTFP Growth
Cumulative RTFP Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Time trend 17.586*** 13.884*** 13.523*** 14.468*** 13.845*** 13.625***
(0.630) (0.537) (0.601) (3.319) (1.019) (0.574)
Structural break in slope (FL) 8.992*** 8.407*** 9.115*** 8.897*** 11.083***
(1.120) (1.194) (1.351) (2.368) (2.100)
Structural break in level (FL) 7.015
(5.620)
Structural break in slope (TL) -0.673
(3.769)
Structural break in slope (Falsiﬁcation test) 0.116
(1998) (2.527)
Structural break in slope (Falsiﬁcation test) -3.513
(2004) (2.999)
R2 0.981 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.997
N 17 17 17 17 17 17
Notes: all regressions include a constant. *,**, *** signiﬁcant at 10, 5, 1%, respectively. Source: APEH.
51Table 16: Contribution to Aggregate RTFP Growth
Total Sample Balanced
Panel
RTFPG Reallocation Within- Within-
Firm Firm
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A- Mean Growth Rate
Before 5.8 4.8 1.0 0.9
After 9.7 1.7 7.9 7.3
B- Contribution to Aggregate RTFP Growth (column 1)
Before 100.0 83.4 16.5 16.5
After 100.0 18.0 82.0 75.4
Appendix A Model: Comparative Static
Proposition 1.
∂xo
(F)
∂τ < 0 and
∂xo
(H)
∂τ < 0. This can be directly seen from equations (5). Furthermore,
|
∂xo
(F)
∂τ | <|
∂xo
(H)
∂τ |.
Proposition 2. At the end of the period, the technology gap between foreign and home ﬁrms within
a industry j will be,

    
    
∆ + 1 with probability xo
(F)
−1 with probability xo
(H)
∆ with probability (1 − xo
(F) − xo
(H))
(21)
Then, under the law of large numbers, the expected technology gap is,
∆e = ∆ + xo
(F) − (1 + ∆)xo
(H) and
∂∆e
∂τ
> 0
Under the law of large numbers and equation (7), foreign ﬁrms’ expected markups are,
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52Proposition 3. From ∆e = ∆ + xo
(F) − (1 + ∆)xo
(H), it can be directly seen that ∂∆e
∂τ∂∆ > 0.
Proposition 4. The sign of
∂gq
∂τ results directly from proposition 1.
Appendix B Model: Credit Constraints for Innovation Activities
In the paper, I have considered that domestic and foreign ﬁrms did not face credit constraints for
innovation activities. In this appendix, I study this possibility and show that credit constraints for
innovation reinforce the mechanism proposed in this paper. In presence of ﬁnancial constraints,
asymmetries in the access to capital markets would aﬀect ﬁrms’ innovation activities more. This
decrease would be even greater for domestic ﬁrms.
One way to study how credit constraints would aﬀect innovation activities is by considering
that ﬁrms have to pay their inputs in advance. To pay them, ﬁrms raise external funds. From
equations (2) and (4), ﬁrms’ expected proﬁts net of innovation costs become:
Maxx(F,j) x(F,j) Π
post
(F,j) + (1 − x(F,j) − x(H,j))Π
pre
(F,j) − (1 + r∗)wΓ(x(F,j),∆(j)) (22)
Maxx(H,j) x(H,j) Π
post
(H,j) − (1 + r)wΓ(x(H,j)) (23)
Similarly as in the paper, ﬁrms choose their optimal innovation eﬀorts so as to maximize their
expected proﬁts net of innovation costs, (22) and (23). They optimal innovations eﬀorts are:
xo
(F) =
1
τ
φ(1 − λ−1)
(1 + r∗)w
Y xo
(H) =
φ(1 − τ λ−1)
(1 + r)w
Y (24)
Note that τ ≡ 1+˜ τ and is higher than in the paper. Recall that in the paper the asymmetric access
to external ﬁnance only concerned capital and, thereby, τ was adjusted by α (i.e. τ ≡ (1 + ˜ τ)α).
As now ﬁrms have to pay both inputs for production activities in advance, the distortion in capital
markets is greater, and aﬀects ﬁrms’ proﬁts and innovation eﬀorts relatively more. In addition,
diﬀerences in interest rates also aﬀect ﬁrms’ innovation activities directly. Equations (24) illustrate
that both ﬁrms’ innovation eﬀorts are reduced by the interest rates. Importantly, the higher interest
rate paid by domestic ﬁrms decreases their innovation intensities relatively more.
In this way, the diﬀerence in the access to capital markets aﬀects ﬁrms’ optimal innovation
eﬀorts through two channels. First, it increases ﬁrms’ innovation costs heterogeneously, which di-
rectly aﬀects their innovation eﬀorts. Second, as shown in the paper, it distorts ﬁrms’ proﬁts from
53production activities, which indirectly aﬀects their innovation incentives. Notably, this distortion
reduces domestic ﬁrms’ innovation activities relatively more. It is worth mentioning that while a
reduction in the tax rate, ˜ τ, fosters domestic ﬁrms’ innovation eﬀorts through these two channels,
foreign ﬁrms’ innovation eﬀorts only rises through the second channel. As such, ﬁnancial openness
encourages domestic ﬁrms’ innovation activities more.
Appendix C Deﬁnition of Variables
Value Added
The database contains information on ﬁrms’ output, materials, employment, capital, sales and
exports. It also provides information on price indexes at the four-digit NACE industry level of ma-
terials, investment, producer and value added. With this information, I construct real value added
as the real output minus real expenses in materials, deﬂated at the producer and the materials
price indexes, respectively.
Capital Stock
The database provides information about the book value of tangibles and intangibles capital. Fol-
lowing the perpetual inventory method and Kátay and Wolf (2008) considerations for the Hungarian
database, I estimate capital stock as the real value of ﬁxed assets. To compute the capital stock, I
use the entire period that the sample oﬀers: from 1992 to 2008. First, I construct investment ﬂows.
As the database provides no information about ﬁrm’s investment, I estimate it as a residual from
the increase in the accounting capital in the year plus the depreciation value.
pI
jtIijt = ∆AKijt + δitAKijt−1
where pI
jt is the price of investment in the 4-digit NACE sector j at period t; Iijt is ﬁrm’s investment;
∆AKijt is the increase in the accounting value of ﬁxed assets; δitAKijt−1 is the depreciation value.
After constructing the value of the nominal investment for each ﬁrm and year, I can estimate the
series of capital stock for each ﬁrm:
Kit = (1 − δit)Kit−1 + Iit
where both capital and investment are deﬂated at the four-digit NACE price index, and the initial
condition of the capital stock is the value in the year the ﬁrm enters in the database.
Firm’s RTFP
From the Cobb-Douglas production function, I estimate ﬁrm’s RTFP:
PitYit = RTFPit L
βs
it Kαs
it
54where i, s and t denote ﬁrm, two-digit industry sector and year; βs and αs are the estimated
elasticities of the production function; and Yit denotes the ﬁrm’s value added. For robustness, I use
the three most commonly used methodologies to estimate those elasticities: Petrin and Levinsohn
(2011), Olley and Pakes (1996), and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Then, the ﬁrm’s total
factor productivity becomes:
ln ˆ RTFPit = lnYit − ( ˆ βslnLit + ˆ αslnKit) (25)
where theˆrepresents estimated values.
Industry Concentration
I estimate the level of concentration in each sector using the Lerner Index (LI) for each three-digit
industry,
LI =
operating proﬁt − ﬁnancial costs
sales
Operating costs are computed as total sales minus payroll and materials costs. The ﬁnancial cost
of capital is the net capital stock valued at the interest rate. The level of concentration is the
weighted sum of the Lerner index of ﬁrms within the industry,
Cjt =
X
ij
sijtLIijt
where sijt is the market share of ﬁrm i in the three-digit sector j at year t, and Cjt is the concen-
tration index.
Aggregate RTFP Growth
Following Petrin and Levinsohn (2011), I deﬁne aggregate RTFP as the sum of ﬁrms’ value added
minus their total expenditures of inputs,
RTFP =
Nt X
it
V Ait −
Nt X
it
X
izt
WiztZizt
where i and t denote ﬁrm and year; N is the total number of ﬁrms in the economy; V A represents
the value added; W is the price of input z; and Z denotes inputs: capital and labor. Then, the
change in aggregate RTFP is,
dRTFP =
Nt X
it
dV Ait −
Nt X
it
X
izt
WiztdZizt (26)
Consider ﬁrms production function as:
Qit = Qi(Zzit,TFPit)
multiplying this expression by ﬁrms prices Pit and diﬀerentiating totally,
V Ait = Pit dQit = Pit
X
zt
∂Qit
∂Zit
dZit + Pit dTFPit (27)
55Replacing equation (27) in (26) yields the change in aggregate RTFP,
dRTFPt =
Nt X
it
X
izt

Pit
∂Qit
∂Zit | {z }
V MPz
−Wizt

dZit + Pit dTFPit (28)
where V MPz is the value of the marginal product of input z. The term in brackets represents the
wedge between the value of the marginal product of the input and its price. Rearranging the terms,
the growth rate of aggregate RTFP becomes,
∆RTFPt = TEt + REt =
Nt X
i,t
Dit ∆RTFPit +
Nt X
i,t
X
i,z,t
Dit(εizt − θizt)∆Zizt
where Dit is the ﬁrm’s share in total value added; ε is the input elasticity; and θ is the input share
in value added.
Appendix D Robustness Tests
Table D1: Firm Survival
Unbalanced and Balanced Panels Comparison
Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel Diﬀerence in Means
Value Added 7.5285 9.6780 -2.1494***
(0.0162) (0.0220) (0.0296)
Employment 1.7471 3.2182 -1.4711***
(0.0126) (0.0177) (0.0226)
Labor Productivity 5.9570 6.4597 -0.5026***
(0.0109) (0.0115) (0.0183)
RTFP 0.9814 1.3003 -0.3188***
(0.0108) (0.0118) (0.0180)
Age 1.0841 1.8948 -0.8106***
(0.0068) (0.0047) ( 0.0115)
N 14,701 5,448
Notes: Std errors in parenthesis. All variables are in logs. The table reports the mean of a variable for the unbalanced and
balanced panel in the year prior to the reform (2000). Source: APEH
56Table D2: Robustness Test 1
Capital Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic 0.249*** 0.260*** 0.171*** 0.254*** 0.241*** 0.282***
(0.026) (0.040) (0.031) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Domestic * Exporter -0.019
(0.050)
Exporter 0.008
(0.044)
Constant 0.205*** 0.204*** 0.306*** 0.224*** 0.281*** 0.180***
(0.053) (0.058) (0.059) (0.055) (0.061) (0.053)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector-ﬁxed eﬀects yes
Local trends yes yes yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.060 0.030 0.019 0.029 0.029 0.031
N 5448 5448 4747 4950 4881 5158
Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic 0.046*** 0.041* 0.070*** 0.052*** 0.061*** 0.060***
(0.015) (0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017)
Domestic * Exporter 0.006
(0.030)
Exporter -0.030
(0.029)
Constant 0.456*** 0.362*** 0.342*** 0.346*** 0.327*** 0.334***
(0.030) (0.043) (0.045) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector-ﬁxed eﬀects yes
Local trends yes yes yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.235 0.041 0.040 0.039 0.029 0.040
N 5448 5448 4747 4950 4881 5158
RTFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Domestic 0.032* 0.035* 0.057*** 0.031* 0.039** 0.039**
(0.016) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Domestic * Exporter 0.006
(0.023)
Exporter 0.010
(0.029)
Constant 0.369*** 0.370*** 0.323*** 0.343*** 0.352*** 0.341***
(0.033) (0.042) (0.047) (0.045) (0.043) (0.042)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sector-ﬁxed eﬀects yes
Local trends yes yes yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.155 0.082 0.088 0.086 0.077 0.087
N 5448 5448 4747 4950 4881 5158
Notes: Std errors are clustered at 4-digit NACE industries. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rate
of the 4-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls are capital intensity and TFP
average growth rate at 4-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the initial
year (1998). Column 1 controls for four-digit industry ﬁxed eﬀects. Column 2 controls for export status, where exporter is deﬁned as
having an average export share larger than 0.05 between 1998 and 2000. Column 3 removes those foreign ﬁrms whose foreign shares
exceed more than 90% of total shares on average between 1998 and 2000. Column 4 restrict the analysis to foreign ﬁrms that are not
used as export platforms (more than 90% of exports). Column 5 removes the top 1 percentile of ﬁrms (in value added). Column 6
controls for ﬁrms that change the ownership status between the pre- and post-reform periods (285 ﬁrms). Source: APEH.
57Table D3: Robustness Test 2
RTFP Markups
WLP DLTL PCM WLP DLTL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Domestic 0.028*** 0.081***
(0.009) (0.026)
Foreign -0.127** -0.034*** -0.024*
(0.051) (0.011) (0.013)
Constant 0.285*** 0.627*** -0.159* -0.109*** -0.143***
(0.037) (0.118) (0.082) (0.022) (0.040)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.034 0.065 0.006 0.028 0.019
N 4864 4839 5029 4864 4839
Notes: Std errors are clustered at 4-digit NACE industries. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP
growth rate of the 4-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls are capital
intensity and TFP average growth rate at 4-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm level controls are age, employment
and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Column 1 reports the RTFP measure with the coeﬃcients of the production function
estimated following Wooldridge (2009) and Petrin and Levinsohn (2011) methodology. Column 2 reports the RTFP of the
translog production function using the De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) methodology to estimate the elasticities of the
factor of production. Column 3 reports the price-cost margin estimated as in Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griﬃth, and Howitt
(2005). Column 4 and 5 present the markup estimated using the elasticities computed for columns 1 and 2, and following
equation (14). Source: APEH
Table D4: Financial Dependence: Investment in Capital and Productivity- Robustness Test
Capital Intensity Labor Productivity RTFP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Domestic 0.246*** 0.253*** 0.252*** 0.061*** 0.019 0.016 0.080*** -0.015 -0.023
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025)
Domes.* Fin. Dep. 0.117 0.163* 0.162* 0.080 0.158*** 0.154*** 0.120 0.218*** 0.208***
(0.093) (0.083) (0.084) (0.069) (0.054) (0.049) (0.086) (0.084) (0.072)
Financial Depen-
dence
-0.066 -0.071 -0.059 0.285*** 0.322*** 0.329** 0.129 0.193* 0.245***
(0.059) (0.067) (0.073) (0.083) (0.108) (0.122) (0.098) (0.098) (0.089)
Constant 0.089*** 0.187*** 0.183*** 0.106** 0.323*** 0.290*** 0.004 0.371*** 0.332***
(0.027) (0.047) (0.052) (0.042) (0.073) (0.086) (0.036) (0.045) (0.048)
Firm-level controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Local trends yes yes yes
Global trends yes yes yes
R2 0.022 0.034 0.034 0.035 0.075 0.082 0.022 0.115 0.124
N 4915 4915 4914 4915 4915 4914 4915 4915 4915
Notes: Std errors are clustered at 4-digit NACE industries. Regressions only include foreign ﬁrms whose foreign owned shares exceed the 50%.
Financial Dependence is the Rajan and Zingales (1998) index. Global industry controls include capital intensity and TFP growth rate of the
4-digit NACE industries in the United States between 1998 and 2004. Local industry controls are capital intensity and RTFP average growth
rate at 4-digit level in Hungary in the late 90s. Firm level controls are age, employment and RTFP in the initial year (1998). Source: APEH
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